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INTRODUCTION 
Medical marijuana law and policy is at a crossroads in America. On 
the one hand, it appears the field has achieved a level of legitimacy it so 
desperately sought, as more than 30 states, territories, and districts have 
enacted comprehensive medical marijuana1 programs in the past two 
decades. Such programs currently employ thousands of Americans and are 
expected to generate thousands of additional jobs across the country in the 
coming years,2 while also generating much-needed tax revenue for state 
economies ravaged by austerity politics.3 Further, comprehensive medical 
marijuana programs create extensive legal protections for program 
participants, commonly known as “qualified patients,”4 shielding them from 
government sanctions that would normally apply to marijuana users. 
In spite of these gains, medical marijuana is often still characterized 
as little more than a joke or an excuse to lend drug abusers an unearned air 
of legitimacy.5 Proponents of these views point to the supposedly-outsized 
                                                 
 1. This Article seeks only to describe the constitutional violations facing medical 
marijuana users, though many of the same arguments could be made for users of recreational 
marijuana in jurisdictions where it has been made legal as well. See Klieger, et al., infra 
notes 32–33 (describing the differences between comprehensive and non-comprehensive 
programs). This Article will describe all jurisdictions with medical marijuana programs as 
“states” for the sake of simplicity, unless otherwise noted. 
 2. Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Industry Projected to Create More Jobs Than 
Manufacturing by 2020, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2017, 10:51 AM), https://perma.cc/M8ZJ-AY7T 
(describing the positive effects that medical and recreational marijuana legalization has had 
and predicting large growth in the sector in the coming years). 
 3. The medical marijuana market was worth roughly $4.7 billion in 2016 and is 
estimated to be worth $13.2 billion in 2025. NEW FRONTIER DATA, THE CANNABIS INDUSTRY 
ANNUAL REPORT: 2017 LEGAL MARIJUANA OUTLOOK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 (2017). 
 4. Although this specific term is not used by every state, this Article will hereafter 
refer to all individuals registered under medical marijuana laws as “qualified patients,” 
unless noted otherwise. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2801(13) (LexisNexis, LEXIS 
through 1st Reg. Sess. of 53d Leg. (2017)); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130 / 10(t) (2016); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-3(G) (2017). 
 5. See Paula Reid & Stephanie Condon, DEA Chief Says Smoking Marijuana as 
Medicine “Is a Joke”, CBS NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015, 3:10 PM), https://perma.cc/W5AU-VJWY. 
As will be further discussed, the question of medical marijuana’s scientific legitimacy is still 
being debated in some states. Mark Osborne, Mormon Church Comes Out in Opposition to 
Utah’s Medical Marijuana Ballot Initiative, ABC NEWS (May 12, 2018, 3:28 AM), 
https://perma.cc/933C-962D. 
 Media outlets frequently use the drug and the culture around marijuana use to craft 
headline puns. See, e.g., David W. Clark, Missouri House’s Medical Marijuana Bill is 
Nothing but a Smokescreen, KANSAS CITY STAR (May 13, 2018, 8:30 PM) 
https://perma.cc/E8C3-87FR; Randy Tucker, Ohio’s Medical Marijuana Program Could Be 
Blunted by Judge’s Ruling, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (May 14, 2018, 10:13 AM), 
https://perma.cc/E8C3-87FR. 
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number of registrants in any given state or deride the medical reasoning used 
for registration as illegitimate.6 The other, more pressing issue facing 
comprehensive medical marijuana programs and participants is the federal 
government’s near-complete ban on marijuana, regardless of form, which 
criminalizes possession, cultivation, and distribution as felony offenses 
punishable by numerous criminal and civil penalties.7 Further, federal law 
utilizes a number of lesser-known, “soft” penalties against individuals found 
to have used marijuana, including forbidding marijuana users from obtaining 
government-backed student loans, making banking nearly impossible for 
dispensaries and cultivation centers,8 and qualifying an individual’s Second 
Amendment right to possess firearms. 
Standing in stark contrast to medical marijuana, the right to bear 
arms, and firearms by virtue of the association, is afforded rarified status as 
one of the most cherished and protected rights afforded to Americans.9 
Firearms proponents have the backing of the National Rifle Association, one 
of, if not the most powerful lobbying organization in America,10 and a 
Congress that is loath to tackle gun control under any circumstances, despite 
mounting evidence to the contrary.11 If anything, the right appears to be 
expanding. Indeed, the landmark Supreme Court case, District of Columbia 
v. Heller,12 overturned more than 200 years of Second Amendment precedent 
and recognized—for the first time—the personal right for law-abiding 
individuals to possess a firearm for any lawful purpose. This Article explores 
the rarely-discussed nexus where medical marijuana legalization, federal 
marijuana prohibition, and Second Amendment jurisprudence converge. 
Part I begins by describing comprehensive medical marijuana laws 
and policies as a basis for the discussion to follow, before moving on to look 
at marijuana treatment at the federal level. In 1996, California passed the 
                                                 
 6. Gerald Caplan, Medical Marijuana: A Study of Unintended Consequences, 43 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 127, 129–35 (2012) (collecting examples purporting to be proof of 
“implementation . . . problems”); but see PROCON.ORG, infra note 304. 
 7. See generally KARIN D. JONES & JAMES M. SHORE, MARIJUANA REGULATION 
§ 2.04 (2018) (describing taxes on marijuana of up to $100 per ounce and mandatory 
minimum sentences of two to ten years accompanied by up to a $20,000 fine). 
 8. See LISA N. SACCO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44782, THE MARIJUANA 
POLICY GAP AND THE PATH FORWARD 16–20 (2017). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 10. See Alan Berlow & Gordon Witkin, Gun Lobby’s Money and Power Still Holds 
Sway over Congress, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 1, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/EL6T-JZJK. 
 11. See Matt Taylor, Why Wasn’t Sandy Hook the Mass Shooting that Changed 
Everything?, VICE (Dec. 14, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/EHQ3-D42J (describing 
America’s acceptance of mass shootings as a fact of life and congressional inaction 
following the deaths of 20 elementary school children and six adults); see also David 
Montero, FBI Chief in Nevada Says Motive Behind Las Vegas Concert Massacre is Still a 
Mystery, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://perma.cc/Y3YF-HNLQ (reporting, 
more than two months after the deadliest mass shooting in American history, that authorities 
are still in the dark regarding the shooter’s motive). 
 12. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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Compassionate Use Act,13 becoming the first state to create a comprehensive 
medical marijuana program, making marijuana use, cultivation, distribution, 
and possession legal for medicinal purposes. In just over 21 years, the 
number of states with similar programs has swelled to more than 30,14 each 
of which considers the use of marijuana to be a humanitarian medical act 
intended to alleviate the pain and suffering associated with certain 
debilitating medical conditions. These states provide expansive legal 
protections for qualified patients against criminal and civil sanctions by 
government citizens as well, with some providing similar protections against 
discrimination by private actors. Notably, in a seeming rebuke to Congress’ 
rationale under the Gun Control Act, most of these states allow for qualified 
patients to possess firearms, providing exceptions to state law where 
possession by marijuana users is otherwise forbidden.15 
Congress created the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) in 1970, 
which classified marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic, thus making it illegal 
under federal law.16 Since then, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), which is charged with administering 
the CSA, have resisted all calls to reschedule marijuana to the less-strict 
Schedule II,17 citing a dearth of sufficient scientific research tending to show 
marijuana’s efficacy as a medicinal treatment in spite of Schedule I’s 
research restrictions.18 Recent years have greatly confused federal marijuana 
policy and enforcement, however. Beginning in 2009, President Obama’s 
DOJ released a series of three often confusing and seemingly-contradictory 
memos describing its shifting but relaxed enforcement policies against both 
medical and recreational marijuana programs and participants, though they 
have likely been repealed under the new administration.19 Congress also had 
its say, successfully outmaneuvering all DOJ enforcement of medical 
marijuana programs in 2014 by passing the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, 
an appropriations rider that forbids the DOJ from using any funds made 
available by Congress to prevent states from implementing or furthering their 
programs.20 Two subsequent Ninth Circuit rulings upheld the application of 
Rohrabacher-Farr against the DOJ and its subsidiary agencies.21 
                                                 
 13. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2017) (Adopted by voters, Cal. 
Prop. 215 § 1, effective November 6, 1996). 
 14. See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 15. See infra Appendix, Table 2. 
 16. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 
(2016)); see also § 812(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2016). 
 17. See sources cited infra notes 104–09. 
 18. But see infra note 45. 
 19. See memoranda cited infra notes 135–37, 161. 
 20. Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat. 2130 § 538 (2014). 
 21. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Marin All., 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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Part II gives a brief overview of Second Amendment and Gun 
Control Act jurisprudence, which has changed and expanded drastically since 
2008. Similar to the CSA, the Gun Control Act contains numerous provisions 
qualifying the Second Amendment rights of individuals for illegal or 
seemingly-dangerous conduct, which this Article terms “individual category 
qualifications.” This Article will predominately focus on section 922(g)(3) 
of the Gun Control Act, which denies illegal drug users the right to possess 
firearms22 under the auspices that such individuals are “presumptively risky 
people” and more dangerous to the general public.23 Thus, in the eyes of the 
federal government, if a qualifying patient uses marijuana, she forfeits her 
right to possess a firearm under the Second Amendment for so long as she is 
considered a user. 
Separately, though still critically linked, the Supreme Court’s 
aforementioned decision in Heller left federal courts with no manageable 
standard for assessing the constitutionality of federal firearms regulations 
found in the Gun Control Act. In order to fill this vacuum, the federal circuit 
courts created a two-part test, largely cribbed from the text of Heller, 
intended to determine (1) whether the rule or regulation in question burdens 
an individual’s Second Amendment rights, and if so, (2) whether the burden 
in question passes muster under the appropriate level of scrutiny.24 Since its 
adoption, the test has been used successfully only once, in Tyler v. Hillsdale 
County Sheriff’s Department.25 There, the Sixth Circuit described the 
appropriate application of the post-Heller two-step test, including the need to 
consider the length of the qualification’s temporal limitation against the 
individual, but more importantly, whether the individual is considered more 
violent than the general public and the manner by which federal courts should 
review and use longitudinal scientific evidence26 to answer that question. 
Part III attempts to bring together each of these loose ends, beginning 
with an examination of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wilson v. Lynch.27 
While the case differs slightly from what a “conventional” qualified patient 
                                                 
 22. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1220 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2017)). 
 23. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing S. Rep. No. 
90-1501, at 22 (1968)). 
 24. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation 
omitted). 
 25. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 699 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 26. Id. at 697–98. Longitudinal scientific evidence is produced by studies which 
“employ continuous or repeated measures to follow particular individuals over prolonged 
periods of time—often years or decades.” Edward Joseph Caruana et al., Longitudinal 
Studies, 7 J. THORACIC DISEASE E537, E537 (2015). Such studies are typically observational 
in nature, comprised of highly-controlled environments accounting for the numerous 
variables encountered in each study, and control groups with minimal outside influence 
being applied and as much data being collected as possible. Though such studies do present 
some drawbacks, the positives outweigh the negatives, especially for macro-level statistical 
analysis. Id. at E537–38. 
 27. Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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can expect in the future, it is still instructive as it is the first federal circuit 
court decision to apply the Gun Control Act to qualified patients. This Article 
argues that the Ninth Circuit made three critical errors in reaching an 
inappropriate and unconstitutional conclusion under the two-step test. First, 
it held that qualified patients suffer only a limited temporal limitation under 
the qualification imposed by the Gun Control Act because they may give up 
their state marijuana registration and thereafter become eligible to again 
possess a firearm.28 Second, the court found that marijuana users, including 
qualified patients, are more violent than the general population solely on the 
basis of conclusions arrived at by another federal circuit court, which were 
based both upon non-longitudinal government surveys and gross misreadings 
of the conclusions and analyses of the studies reviewed.29 Third, the Ninth 
Circuit found that even if it was visiting constitutional violations upon 
qualified patients, precedent allows for such overreaches against a minority 
of individuals.30 In addition to these incorrect conclusions, such arguments 
should have been ruled moot as this Article further argues that the 
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment blocks the DOJ and any of its subsidiary 
agencies from enforcing the CSA or Gun Control Act against qualified 
patients as such actions impede the implementation of medical marijuana 
programs. 
I. MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS 
This Part explores the confusing, contradictory, and competing laws 
governing medical marijuana across the United States. Section A looks to 
state medical marijuana regimes where laws are rapidly expanding, 
progressive, and protective of qualified patients. That Section also discusses 
the differences between legalization and decriminalization, a key distinction 
for qualified patients. Section B, conversely, brings the federal sector into 
focus and finds that the United States government maintains a near-total ban 
on marijuana in any form and stridently opposes rescheduling the drug or 
making exceptions for medical use. Section B further details the 
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, a congressional appropriations rider, which 
was enacted in December 2014, and has caused no small amount of confusion 
and widespread change at the federal level.31 
To determine which laws govern medical marijuana, it is first helpful 
to define exactly what is meant by the term itself. Both within the context of 
this Article and in broader discussion in American policy, medical marijuana 
legalization typically refers to “comprehensive” medical marijuana programs 
that meet the four following criteria: (1) Provide legal protections from 
                                                 
 28. Id. at 1093. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1098. 
 31. Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat. 2130 § 538 (2014). 
2018] STICKY SITUATION 121 
criminal and civil charges for individuals operating within state laws; (2) 
Provide access to marijuana either through private cultivation, dispensaries 
open to the public, or some other easily accessible outlet; (3) Allow for the 
cultivation and public distribution of a variety of strains of all strengths, not 
solely low-tetrahydrocannabinol (hereinafter, “THC”), high-cannabidiol 
(hereinafter “CBD”) products; and (4) Allow for the consumption of 
marijuana products in a variety of ways, including smoking, vaporization, or 
eating.32 Low-THC, high-CBD products have been legalized in 16 additional 
states, but each state’s legalization program fails to include one or more of 
the four criteria above.33 Federal law, conversely, makes no distinction 
between high- or low-THC marijuana and considers all such products to be 
Schedule I narcotics under the CSA.34 
A. Comprehensive Medical Marijuana Programs 
In 1996, when California successfully implemented the country’s 
first state-run medical marijuana initiative, the prospects for widespread 
medical marijuana legalization—even at the state level—seemed grim, as 
Arizona voters had also approved a medical marijuana initiative, but it was 
scuttled before becoming law due to incorrect wording.35 At the time, every 
state had criminalized the possession, cultivation, distribution, and use of 
                                                 
 32. See Sarah B. Klieger et al., Mapping Medical Marijuana: State Laws Regulating 
Patients, Product Safety, Supply Chains and Dispensaries, 2017, 112 ADDICTION 2206, 2207 
(2017); State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last 
updated June 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/N7E6-H6K7. This Article will focus almost 
exclusively on states with comprehensive medical marijuana regimes, though non-
comprehensive programs are considered by both federal law and the Rohrabacher-Farr 
Amendment. 
 Washington, D.C.’s medical marijuana program is, perhaps understandably, something 
of an outlier in that it does not protect qualified patients from either civil sanctions by 
government actors or the denial of any rights or privileges afforded to citizens otherwise, yet 
it is still considered comprehensive. See D.C. CODE § 7-1671.08(c), (d) (2018). 
 33. See Klieger et al., supra note 32, at 2207–08; 17 States with Laws Specifically 
About Legal Cannabidiol (CBD), PROCON.ORG (May 8, 2018, 11:13 AM), 
https://perma.cc/4BGN-PBNU; but see MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE 
MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: HOW TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF ARREST, 2015, at A-11 (2015 
& Supp. 2016) (stating that Missouri may have a “workable” low-THC law). 
 34. John Hudak & Christine Stenglein, DEA Guidance is Clear: Cannabidiol is Illegal 
and Always Has Been, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/4HMN-XGDJ. 
 35. Prior to successfully legalizing marijuana in 2010, Arizonans twice voted in favor 
of medical marijuana initiatives only to see both ballot initiatives overturned prior to 
implementation as each contained fatally-flawed language. The aforementioned 1996 
proposal failed when “federal authorities threatened to revoke the licenses of doctors who 
prescribed marijuana” while the 1998 version required the federal government to legalize the 
use of medical marijuana prior to state legalization. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Prop. 203: 
Legalization of Medical Marijuana, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Sept. 26, 2010, 1:07 PM), 
https://perma.cc/HM5E-VWPR. 
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marijuana since the 1930s,36 nationwide efforts toward legalization by other 
states were still years away, and public approval for legalization was sitting 
at 25% in August 1995.37 Nevertheless, California voters approved the 
measure and laid the groundwork for the future. 
Since California made the first move, 29 other states, in addition to 
Washington, D.C., Guam, and Puerto Rico38 have followed suit and created 
their own comprehensive medical marijuana programs, legalizing use, 
possession, cultivation, and distribution to varying degrees—bringing the 
total number to 33 states. Though all comprehensive medical marijuana 
programs differ to some degree, they share similar legislative framework and 
characteristics across a broad spectrum. Like California’s Compassionate 
Use Act,39 each state identifies a number of similar factors, including the 
following: who may participate, what medical conditions qualify 
participants, outlining the role of physicians in the program, and 
establishment of legal protections for qualified patients and distributors. 
Within the context of these state laws, it is appropriate for this Article 
to address a question that is at once both critical to the information presented 
and oft-maligned as a joke: Is marijuana considered an accepted form of 
medicine?40 In 1999, following a request from the Clinton White House, the 
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) compiled and published an extensive report 
that “summarizes and analyzes what is known about the medical use of 
marijuana,” emphasizing the “evidence-based medicine . . . as opposed to 
belief-based medicine.”41 While the report notes that marijuana is considered 
controversial in many respects, the IOM was unequivocal in its assessment 
of marijuana’s efficacy as a therapeutic form of medicine, stating that, 
[c]ontroversies concerning nonmedical use of marijuana 
spill over onto the medical marijuana debate and tend to 
obscure the real state of scientific knowledge. In contrast 
with the many disagreements bearing on the social issues, 
                                                 
 36. Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1427 n.14 (2009). 
 37. GALLUP, Do You Think the Use of Marijuana Should be Made Legal, or Not?, in 
ILLEGAL DRUGS, https://perma.cc/9682-TCJK. 
 38. See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 39. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2017). 
 40. Though some may scoff at the question, given the growing social and political 
acceptance of medical marijuana, it is notable that as of 2016, the U.S. government still did 
not consider marijuana to have proven medicinal value. Denial of Petition to Initiate 
Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,688, 53,700 (Aug. 12, 2016); see 
also Jennifer De Pinto et al., Marijuana Legalization Support at All-Time High, CBS NEWS 
(Apr. 20, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/RZ54-YR9C (reporting that polls show that 88% 
of Americans believe marijuana should be legalized for medicinal purposes). 
 41. INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA & MED.: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 1–2 (1999) 
(defining evidence-based medicine as “derived from knowledge and experience informed by 
rigorous scientific analysis” and belief-based medicine as “derived from judgment, intuition, 
and beliefs untested by rigorous science”). 
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the study team found substantial consensus, among experts 
in the relevant disciplines, on the scientific evidence bearing 
on potential medical use.42 
The IOM arrived at this consensus after finding more than 30 
separate, individualized, medical uses for marijuana in addition to treatment 
of generalized symptoms like “pain, nausea and vomiting, and muscle 
spasms.”43 In short, the IOM found that a consensus of available data and 
reporting showed that marijuana is not only widely considered to be a form 
of medicine that provides therapeutic relief for a wide range of conditions, 
but that its side effects, such as the psychoactive “high,” are “within 
acceptable risks associated with approved medications,” and such side effects 
are even useful to individuals treating certain conditions such as anxiety.44 
Marijuana as a form of therapeutic medicine is no longer a controversial 
question within the scientific and medical communities as evidenced by a 
follow-up report released in 2017 by the IOM’s parent organization, the 
National Academy of Sciences.45 The 2017 study arrived at nearly 100 
conclusions based on new studies and data finding conclusive evidence exists 
showing that marijuana is effective as a therapeutic form of medicine.46 
Following this lead, states that have adopted comprehensive medical 
marijuana programs have endorsed the scientific consensus on the matter. 
Some states, such as Washington, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, are quite 
explicit in this regard, having codified references to medical marijuana as a 
humanitarian act meant to improve quality of life and forthrightly state that 
one of the bases for their laws is to accrue medical benefits to qualified 
patients.47 Those states without a specific declaration to that effect have 
tacitly embraced the idea by the very wording of the laws and their 
requirements, such as mandating some proof of a qualifying condition.48 
                                                 
 42. Id. at 13–14 (emphasis added); see also id. at 34–35. 
 43. Id. at 138. The study was conducted utilizing a series of comprehensive workshops 
comprised of experts discussing the issue and a panel of nine experts on the subject reviewed 
the literature and studies presented, which heard comment from a “roughly equal number[] 
of persons and organizations opposed to and in favor of the medical use of marijuana.” Id. at 
15–16. 
 44. Id. at 125–27, 137–38. The study additionally concluded that while some 
individuals who experience “contraindicated” effects from the use of marijuana, this is not 
uncommon to “many medications.” Id. at 127. 
 45. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND 
CANNABINOIDS: THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
1–6 (2017). 
 46. Id. at 7–22. 
 47. See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10231.102(1) (West Supp. 2018); 21 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-2(1) (Supp. 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.005 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6). 
 48. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C § Appx. (West, Westlaw through 
Chapter 108 of 2018 2d Ann. Sess.) (entitled “Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana”). 
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While all medical marijuana regimes differ to some degree, as the 
remainder of this Part will no doubt illustrate, they each share a few common 
elements. One such example requires that all qualified patients suffer from a 
“debilitating”49 or “serious” medical condition,50 usually termed a 
“qualifying condition.” A prospective registrant51 thus becomes a qualified 
patient in the eyes of her state provided she suffers from a qualifying 
condition and can show proof of that malady.52 Typically, the patient is 
diagnosed with the qualifying condition by a physician or specialist and later 
sees a separate licensed physician who may recommend medical marijuana 
after reviewing copies of the patient’s diagnosis.53 In order to qualify under 
state laws, the attending physician must determine that the patient’s 
qualifying condition “may be alleviated”54 by the use of marijuana or the 
patient may “benefit” from its use in order to make a recommendation.55 
The use of “recommendation” as opposed to “prescription,” both 
here and in legislation, is purposeful. It is a carefully-used term of legal art, 
employed to keep medical marijuana programs free from at least one form of 
federal encroachment.56 Indeed, it is likely that this act of foresight in the 
Compassionate Use Act57 is what kept California’s medical marijuana regime 
operating initially, and thereafter allowed the trend to continue.58 At the time 
California’s medical marijuana regime was created, the federal government 
was keen to end it, but did not seek to do so via lawsuit against the state 
directly. 
Instead, the federal government announced a new policy: the DEA 
would revoke the registration of any physician who recommended medical 
marijuana, effectively ending their ability to write prescriptions or otherwise 
                                                 
 49. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(a). 
 50. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7(a), (h) (Deering 2017). 
 51. Minors are usually allowed to become qualified patients, though the requirements 
are typically much stricter than those for adults. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(6) 
(requiring individuals under the age of 18 to obtain multiple physician diagnoses and a 
parent to serve as primary caregiver); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329-122(b) (LexisNexis, 
LEXIS through Act 51 of 2018 Sess.) (requiring parental consent and monitoring). 
 52. Each state’s list of qualifying conditions varies, but usually includes cancer, AIDS 
and HIV, glaucoma, Cachexia, multiple sclerosis, and other conditions or disorders that 
cause severe or chronic pain, nausea, seizures, and /or muscle spasms. Klieger et al., supra 
note 32, at 2211–12 tbl.3. 
 53. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(a), (j); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 11362.7(h), (i) (Deering 2017). 
 54. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(a)(II). 
 55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.005(1)(a) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 
6). Other states, such as Hawaii, have stricter requirements for recommendations and require 
that the benefits outweigh the risks to the patient. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329-122(a)(2) 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through Act 51 of 2018 Sess.). 
 56. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 635–36 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 57. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2017). 
 58. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 639; see also Mikos, supra note 36, at 1465–69. Incorrect 
terminology of this type doomed Arizona’s initial efforts to pass medical marijuana laws. 
See Lee, supra note 35. 
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dispense medication and thus killing the market for medical marijuana in 
California.59 This strategy insured many physicians would stop 
recommending marijuana, but it also ran afoul of the United States 
Constitution. The Ninth Circuit stated as much when it found the 
government’s policy to be an unconstitutional violation of the doctors’ First 
Amendment rights.60 The government argued that to recommend medical 
marijuana is to encourage criminal behavior.61 The court, however, was 
unmoved, believing that the violations of free speech were too great and the 
“potential harms were too attenuated from the proscribed speech.”62 The 
government unsuccessfully appealed and eventually accepted the outcome.63 
Following a physician’s recommendation, all states require the 
patient to register with the state and obtain an identification card before she 
can purchase, possess, or use marijuana legally.64 Due to the amount of 
patient information being shared between doctors and agencies, many states 
have also created laws which make it unlawful to either access or disseminate 
qualifying patient information.65 A small number of states eschew mandatory 
registration schemes and have adopted programs that allow for compliance 
via different methods. California, for example, only began a voluntary 
registration program in 2003.66 The State of Washington created its 
registration program in 2016, though it is voluntary and state law explicitly 
allows non-registered medical marijuana users to raise their medical 
condition as an affirmative defense to marijuana-related charges by law 
enforcement if they have not registered with the State.67 Once registered, the 
                                                 
 59. Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 
215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997); Conant, 309 F.3d at 639–40 (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (arguing that revoking a doctor’s ability to write a prescription is akin to 
destroying her ability to practice medicine in America). 
 60. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (finding the policy unconstitutional as it sought “to 
punish physicians on the basis of the content of doctor-patient communications,” that only 
the “discussions of the medical use of marijuana trigger the policy,” and “the policy does not 
merely prohibit the discussion of marijuana; it condemns expression of a particular 
viewpoint”). 
 61. Id. at 638. 
 62. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., Inc., 535 U.S. 234, 251–52 (2002)). 
 63. Walters v. Conant, 540 U.S. 946, 946 (2003) (denying certiorari); Conant v. 
McCaffrey, No. 00-17222, 2003 U.S. App LEXIS 3932, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2003) 
(denying en banc rehearing). 
 64. See ARK. CONST. amend. 98, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(3)(b). The State 
of Washington did not require registration as part of its medical marijuana program from 
initiation in 1998 until 2016. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.010(19)(a)(vi)(B) 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6). 
 65. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(3)(a); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.713 
(Deering 2017). 
 66. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.71 (Deering 2017). 
 67. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.043 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6). 
Maine had a similar statute repealed in 2009. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2427 (Supp. 
2016). 
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individual becomes a qualifying patient, subject to all the protections 
afforded by her state’s laws.68 
The final piece of legislative framework discussed by this Article is 
the scope of the legal protections afforded to qualified patients. While 
decriminalization became a popular method to alleviate some minor criminal 
consequences and decrease unnecessary arrests,69 comprehensive medical 
marijuana programs go much farther. They legalize possession, purchase, 
consumption, cultivation, and distribution within statutory confines, usually 
placing these actions under the term “use.”70 
Comprehensive legalization removes criminal and civil penalties 
associated with state prosecution for the use of marijuana. Such protections 
are important to qualified patients and states alike, as more than 99% of all 
marijuana arrests are affected by state, not federal, law enforcement 
officers.71 When a state creates a medical marijuana program and legalizes 
marijuana, it no longer stands in line with either the CSA or the federal 
government and is instead in conflict.72 Qualified patients are, in the eyes of 
their local law enforcement,73 law-abiding individuals seeking a form of 
medical attention.74 States enshrine legal protections into their medical 
marijuana statutes, providing explicit protection to qualified patients from 
criminal and civil consequences—including civil forfeiture75—enforced by 
state actors, either via providing the qualified patient with an affirmative 
                                                 
 68. See ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.010(c) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2017 legislation.); 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.712 (Deering 2017). 
 69. See LISA N. SACCO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44782, THE MARIJUANA 
POLICY GAP AND THE PATH FORWARD 7–9 (2017). 
 70. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(b) (defining “medical use” as “acquisition, 
possession, production, use, or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia related to the 
administration of such marijuana”); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.050(2) 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6). 
 71. See Alex Kreit, The Federal Response to State Marijuana Legalization: Room for 
Compromise?, 91 OR. L. REV. 1029, 1036–37 (2013) (stating that marijuana cases disposed 
of in federal court made only 0.8% of all marijuana arrests in the United States in 2010); see 
also Beek v. City of Wyo., 846 N.W.2d 531, 538 (Mich. 2014) (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS 
SERV. § 333.26422 (LexisNexis 2017)) (finding that data provided by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation bears out these statistics). 
 72. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841–844 (2016) (creating harsh criminal penalties for possession and 
distribution of Schedule I substances, including marijuana). 
 73. This should not be read to imply that law enforcement agencies in states with 
comprehensive medical marijuana programs—or both medical and recreational 
legalization—are more concerned with the civil rights of their citizens. For example, 
Colorado, which legalized medical and recreational marijuana in 2000 and 2013, 
respectively, now arrests more minority youths for marijuana-based offenses than it did prior 
to 2013. Ben Markus, As Adults Legally Smoke Pot in Colorado, More Minority Kids 
Arrested for It, NPR (June 29, 2016, 4:50 AM), https://perma.cc/7GT9-JZK4. 
 74. See sources cited supra notes 41–48. 
 75. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(2)(e); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4(G) 
(2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.050(1) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6). 
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defense to charges stemming from marijuana use under the statute76 or by 
exempting such individuals from sanctions altogether.77 Increasingly, 
however, some states have become aware that these legal protections, while 
necessary, do not adequately protect qualified patients from the full spectrum 
of consequences they may suffer and are now adding language to protect 
them from private discrimination and violations of civil rights, where 
possible.78 
Seeing the need for expanded protections outside the realm of 
criminal and civil sanctions by state actors, states have begun to craft their 
medical marijuana laws with language intended to expand civil rights and 
anti-discrimination protections for qualified patients. The activities and 
rights that are protected vary from state-to-state, but some examples include 
protections against discrimination on the basis of an individual’s status as a 
qualified patient in employment decisions,79 custody hearings or family law 
matters,80 leasing and housing decisions,81 medical care including organ 
                                                 
 76. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(2)(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453A.310 
(LexisNexis 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.913 (2017); but see D.C. CODE § 7-1671.08(d) 
(2018) (allowing “[c]ivil fines, penalties, and fees” to be imposed in addition to criminal 
penalties for individuals operating outside of or fraudulently representing their participation 
in the medical marijuana program). 
 77. See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10231.2103 (West Supp. 2018); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18 § 4474b(a) (2017). 
 78. Qualified patients cannot sue in federal court for violations under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) as the act specifically excludes individuals who use 
illegal drugs from coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (2016). See also James v. City of Costa 
Mesa, 700 F.3d 394, 397 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding “that the ADA does not protect 
medical marijuana users who claim to face discrimination on the basis of their marijuana 
use”). 
 Though federal ADA application appears settled, debate regarding state-level 
application abounds when a state has legalized medical marijuana and certain other 
conditions exist. Conflict arises when the medical marijuana law also requires non-
discrimination against qualified patients, but the state maintains anti-discrimination statutes 
akin to the ADA and state law requires interpretation consistent with federal anti-
discrimination law. See Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 303 P.3d 147, 149–52 (Colo. App. 
2013) (finding that use of marijuana legally under Colorado’s medical marijuana law still 
violated the CSA, which consequently also violated Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute 
originally based upon the ADA); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & 
Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 533 (Or. 2010) (holding that Oregon’s ADA-equivalent must be 
interpreted consistently with federal law and any state law that would define it otherwise is 
preempted); but see cases cited infra notes 84, 87. 
 79. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 98, § 3(f)(3); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 10231.2103(b) (West Supp. 2018); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4(d) (Supp. 2017). 
 80. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2813(D) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 1st Reg. 
Sess. of 53d Leg. (2017)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126:X2(VI) (Supp. 2014); N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 3369(3) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 Chapters 1–72). 
 81. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2813(A) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 1st Reg. Sess. of 
53d Leg. (2017)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A(a)(1), (c) (2017). 
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transplants,82 and education.83 Though few states have gone so far as 
providing employment protection to qualified patients,84 nearly all states that 
enact comprehensive medical marijuana programs contain language similar 
to that of New Mexico, which states, “[a] qualified patient shall not be subject 
to arrest, prosecution or penalty in any manner for the possession of or the 
medical use of cannabis”85(emphasis added). Broadly-worded statutory 
protections of this ilk would logically mean that—absent language or 
precedent to the contrary86—qualified patients are legally able to possess 
firearms in those states.87 Personal property protections are also 
commonplace, as police are to confiscate private property in raids or busts.88 
                                                 
 82. State laws consider marijuana to be similar to other medication prescribed by a 
physician and not an illicit narcotic for these purposes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 
§ 4905A(a)(2) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126:X2(VII) (Supp. 2014); 21 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 21-28.6-4(r) (Supp. 2017). 
 83. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2813(A) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 1st Reg. 
Sess. of 53d Leg. (2017)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A(c) (2017); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 21-28.6-4(d) (Supp. 2017). 
 84. Both California’s and Oregon’s state supreme courts have ruled that their medical 
marijuana programs do not protect employees who are qualified patients from being fired for 
marijuana use under preemption principles as applied to the ADA. See Ross v. RagingWire 
Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 208–09 (Cal. 2008); Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 
524–25. These decisions have been openly questioned, however. The Michigan Supreme 
Court stated it had “misgivings, mildly put” regarding the logic used in Emerald Steel, where 
the Oregon Supreme Court misstated and misapplied Supreme Court of the United States 
precedent regarding preemption and the CSA; though the Michigan court expressed approval 
of the analysis in Willis v. Winters, 253 P.3d 1058 (Or. 2011), a decision issued subsequent 
to Emerald Steel by the Oregon Supreme Court, which appeared to walk back much of the 
earlier holding’s language. Beek v. City of Wyo., 846 N.W.2d 531, 540 n.6 (Mich. 2014) 
(citation omitted); see also Vikram David Amar, The California Supreme Court’s Decision 
on Whether an Employee Can be Fired for Testing Positive for Off-the-Job, Doctor-
Suggested Medical Use of Marijuana, FINDLAW (Feb. 1, 2008), https://perma.cc/VWU4-
UF4K. 
 85. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4(A) (Supp. 2017); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 69.51A.040 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6). (“may not be arrested, prosecuted, or 
subject to other criminal sanctions or civil consequences”). 
 86. It is plausible that a state could interpret its firearm laws to require that they be 
interpreted consistently with federal Second Amendment jurisprudence, which currently 
qualifies the right to bear arms by qualified patients, and therefore a qualified patient would 
be banned from possessing a firearm at the state level as well. See cases cited supra note 78. 
 87. See Willis, 253 P.3d at 1061–68 (holding that an Oregon qualified patient may 
possess firearm according to Oregon law, that Oregon sheriffs are required to issue 
concealed handgun license to qualified applicants who are also qualified patients, and that 
the Supremacy Clause does not require states to enforce federal firearms statutes); People v. 
Leal, 210 Cal. App. 4th 829, 842 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that defendant had the 
right to use medical marijuana and possess firearm simultaneously while on probation prior 
to stripping him of these rights for using them to mask illegal activities); Corey Hutchins, 
Can You Own a Gun in Colorado if You Smoke Pot?, COLO. INDEP. (Sept. 2, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/PSZ6-FSNF (quoting former director of state police chief’s association 
stating that there is no issue open-carrying a handgun while also legally using marijuana 
under Colorado law); see also infra Appendix, Table 2. 
 88. See DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE 
ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 5 (2d ed. 2015); see also Christopher Ingraham, Law 
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Specifically, states provide that any marijuana or drug paraphernalia 
unlawfully seized by law enforcement agents must be returned to the owner, 
though such protections have been called into question due to possible 
violations of the Constitution and federal law.89 
B. Federal Laws & Policies 
In stark contrast to the constantly-expanding, progressive treatment 
of marijuana at the state level, the United States government operates a rigid 
system that essentially bans marijuana in any respect. Federal policy is based, 
not on currently-available scientific or medical understanding, but on a 
prohibitionist90 approach that rejects findings and conclusions about the 
efficacy and use of marijuana, even its own.91 To accomplish the goal of 
stamping out marijuana usage in America, the federal government uses two 
primary mechanisms: the CSA, which provides the legal mechanisms for 
prohibition, and the DOJ and its subsidiary agencies, which provide 
enforcement and prosecution of the CSA and any collateral laws. 
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act, more commonly known as the Controlled 
Substances Act.92 The CSA gathered numerous federal programs under one 
umbrella and became an all-encompassing control mechanism that, among 
                                                 
Enforcement Took More Stuff from People Than Burglars Did Last Year, WASH. POST (Nov. 
23, 2015), https://perma.cc/MR43-WCWG. 
 89. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4(G) (Supp. 2017) and Mikos, supra note 36, 
at 1459–60 (arguing that returning illegally-seized marijuana and paraphernalia “merely 
restores the state of nature” and should not be subject to the doctrine of preemption, though 
he does admit that there are as yet “no satisfactory answers”) with People v. Crouse, 388 
P.3d 39, 42–43 (Colo. 2017) (en banc) (holding that section 14(2)(e) of Colorado’s medical 
marijuana code is unconstitutional as enacted as it requires state officials to return a 
federally-controlled substance in violation of the CSA, even where state law deems the 
substance to be legal); see also Crouse, 388 P.3d at 45–46 (Gabriel, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that a literal reading of the majority’s holding means that any officer distributing narcotics in 
a sting operation would be actively and knowingly violating the CSA and therefore subject 
to punishment). 
 90. Prohibition of all illegal narcotics has been America’s publicly-stated drug policy 
goal since the early 1970’s. Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and 
Counting: The Continued Failure of the War on Drugs, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, no. 
811, Apr. 12, 2017, at 2–4; see also Medical Marijuana Referenda Movement in America: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) 
(statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of Nat’l Drug Control Pol’y, 
submitted for the Record). 
 91. Congress has made numerous inquiries on the subject, even as early as the Senate 
hearings debating the CSA, where some members called for a study to examine the effects of 
marijuana and possible rescheduling. See S. REP. NO. 91-613, at 1–2, 10 (1969). The study 
was performed in the early 1970’s and concluded that marijuana should be legalized for 
personal, recreational use, but was never implemented. NAT’L COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA 
& DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 466–67 (2d Rep. 1973). 
 92. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 
21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2016)). 
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many others, regulates narcotics scheduling, penalties and sentencing, 
approved scientific and medical research, and the war on drugs.93 Congress 
created the CSA as the centerpiece to all federal actions for marijuana 
enforcement.94 In July 1973, nine precursor agencies were combined to form 
the DEA,95 which was placed under the DOJ96 and subsequently tasked with 
administration and enforcement of the whole of the CSA.97 
The CSA regulates the scheduling of all narcotics—legal or illegal.98 
Since its creation, the CSA has classified marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic, 
meaning that it has “high potential for abuse,” has “no currently accepted 
medical use in treatment,” and exhibits a “lack of accepted safety for use . . . 
under medical supervision.”99 Physicians may not legally dispense or 
prescribe Schedule I substances, but may do so for those on schedules II-
V.100 Other substances listed on Schedule I include heroin, LSD, and 
peyote,101 while Schedule II—considered safer and acceptable for medical 
treatment in the United States—includes opium, cocaine, and 
methamphetamines.102 
The authority to reschedule marijuana lies with the DEA,103 though 
Congress may reschedule a drug via legislation in the absence of action by 
the DEA or Attorney General.104 Since the CSA was enacted, marijuana 
legalization proponents have been making continuous requests and filing 
lawsuits attempting to force the federal government to reschedule marijuana, 
though these have so far been unsuccessful.105 The DEA has responded 
                                                 
 93. Id. 
 94. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., HISTORY OF THE DEA: 1970-1975, at 31, 
https://perma.cc/HG4P-T527. 
 95. Exec. Order 11,727, Drug Law Enforcement, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,357 (July 10, 1973). 
 96. The DEA Administrator reports directly to the Attorney General. Drug 
Enforcement Policy Coordination, 28 C.F.R. § 0.102 (2017). 
 97. 21 U.S.C. § 823 (2016). The Attorney General has formally delegated the 
authority granted to that position by the CSA to the DEA Administrator. Drug Enforcement 
Administration: General Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b) (2017). 
 98. The CSA divides hundreds of drugs, plants, chemicals, and even structural 
compounds into one of five schedules, with tighter regulations on each schedule descending 
from five-to-one, with Schedule I being the most tightly regulated. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2016). 
 99. Id. § 812(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
 100. Id. § 823(f). 
 101. Id. § 812(c), Sch. I(b)(10), (c)(9), (12). 
 102. Id. § 812(c), Sch. II(a)(1), (4), (c). 
 103. Id. § 811(a); see also All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1133 
(D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 104. Recent years have seen U.S. senators introduce bills which would reschedule 
marijuana, though neither has passed, or is likely to, given the current makeup of the Senate. 
See Marijuana Justice Act of 2017, S. 1689, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017) (introduced by Sen. 
Cory Booker (D-NJ)); Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2015, S. 2237, 114th 
Cong. § 3 (2015) (introduced by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT)). 
 105. See Caroline Herman, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative: 
Whatever Happened to Federalism?, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 121, 124–25, n.27 
(2002) (compiling cases dating back to 1974 and noting numerous unsuccessful efforts to 
lobby Congress). 
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unfavorably to requests to reschedule marijuana, describing the evidence 
presented by proponents as inconclusive, anecdotal, or biased.106 One such 
response is particularly telling. Following a two-year congressional hearing 
on marijuana rescheduling held during the 1980s, the presiding 
administrative law judge agreed with the “testimony of a number of 
physicians and patients” that “marijuana has a currently accepted medical 
use” and recommended that it be rescheduled to Schedule II.107 The DEA 
Administrator, however, rejected the recommendation and, after a lengthy 
court battle, settled on a new five-part test that is still used to determine 
whether marijuana is “currently accepted for medical use.”108 Although this 
went against the presiding judge’s recommendation, the D.C. Circuit found 
it to be an acceptable action within the DEA Administrator’s prerogative and 
discretion.109 
Rescheduling marijuana is further hindered by strict federal 
guidelines affecting medical and scientific research, including restrictions on 
who may participate, supply available to researchers, and quality of that 
supply. The federal government greatly restricts research using marijuana 
and requires researchers, or “practitioners,” to register with the DEA in order 
to “dispense, or conduct research with respect to, controlled substances.”110 
Registration to perform research using marijuana or any Schedule I substance 
is separate from the registration a practitioner might have for substances 
under Schedules II-V.111 Practitioners must also adhere to strict quota 
limitations, determined not by practitioners, research guidelines, or scientific 
consensus, but by the discretion of the Attorney General.112 Even 
participation is made more difficult as all applications are sent to the 
Department of Health and Human Services to review the “competency” of 
all applicants and the “merits” of each research protocol.113 
                                                 
 106. See, e.g., Marijuana Scheduling Petition: Denial of Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767, 
53,767-68 (Dec. 29, 1989); Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule 
Marijuana, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,552, 40,552 (July 8, 2011); Denial of Petition to Initiate 
Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,688, 53,688 (Aug. 12, 2016). 
 107. Marijuana Scheduling Petition: Denial of Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767, 53,772 
(Dec. 29, 1989); see also All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d 936, 938, 940–41 
(D.C. Cir. 1991). The DEA Administrator, however, rejected this recommendation and 
instead substituted an eight-factor test to determine “currently accepted medical use” for 
marijuana. Id. at 938. The D.C. Circuit found that two of the factors were impossible or 
unreasonable as imposed and questioned a third that was eventually removed as well and 
remanded the case. Id. at 940–41. 
 108. All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see 
also Marijuana Rescheduling Petition: Denial of Petition, Remand, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,499, 
10,499 (Mar. 26, 1992). 
 109. All. for Cannabis Therapeutics, 15 F.3d at 1135. 
 110. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2016). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. § 826. The Attorney General may arbitrarily decrease quota amounts for 
individuals. Id. § 826(b). 
 113. Id. § 823(f); 21 C.F.R. § 1301.32(a) (2018). These procedures are not required for 
research of substances listed on Schedules II-V. 
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Supply is also strictly controlled, with all marijuana produced for 
research purposes in the United States cultivated at a federal facility at the 
University of Mississippi.114 In 2016, the DEA stated that it would work to 
expand access to supply, though it is too early to tell whether that has 
occurred.115 Additionally, the supply from the University of Mississippi 
facility is of lower potency than the product typically available from a 
dispensary in a state with a comprehensive medical marijuana program, and 
the facility does not produce certain types of products widely available to the 
public, such as edibles and concentrates, among others.116 Once researchers 
have obtained supply, it must be safeguarded under lock-and-key or other 
increased security measures by both practitioners and applicants throughout 
the trial.117 Though research currently shows that marijuana has therapeutic 
effects for numerous debilitating or life-threatening conditions,118 the extent 
of such effects is not fully known in most cases, and CSA-mandated research 
barriers “markedly affect the ability to conduct comprehensive basic, 
clinical, and public health research.”119 Research restrictions imposed by the 
CSA also impede simple tests for purity, contaminants, and chemical 
composition.120 This causes additional concerns, because while most states 
require some level of product safety testing, these measures are not required 
to meet federal standards and vary greatly between each state.121 
Aside from criminal sanctions, probably the most well-known aspect 
of the CSA is America’s five-decade-old policy known colloquially as the 
“war on drugs.” The federal government has long viewed drug use as a 
systemic, societal problem that will “steal . . . children’s lives”122 which has 
                                                 
 114. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 45, at 382–83. The authors note 
the difficulty of any single cultivation center or facility to provide the “array and potency of 
products available in dispensaries across the country.” Id. at 383. 
 115. Applications to Become Registered Under the Controlled Substances Act to 
Manufacture Marijuana to Supple Researchers in the United States, 81 Fed. Reg. 53846 
(2016); NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 45, at 384. 
 116. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 45, at 382–83. 
 117. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.71 (2018). 
 118. See sources cited supra notes 41–48. 
 119. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 45, at 390; see id. at 378–90, 
400–01 (citing federal CSA research policies as the main impediment to research). The 
National Academies note that they were “specifically directed” in their statement of task to 
avoid calling for rescheduling of marijuana, though that is the general consensus from all 
conclusions. Id. at 382 n.15. 
 120. Id. at 380, box 15-1. 
 121. State-mandated testing only tests the product itself and does not test the interaction 
of medical marijuana with other medicines or how it interacts with certain patients. Klieger 
et al., supra note 32, at 2209 tbl.1. 
 122. Aviva Shen, The Disastrous Legacy of Nancy Reagan’s ‘Just Say No’ Campaign, 
THINK PROGRESS, (Mar. 6, 2016, 9:45 PM), https://perma.cc/FV86-RKH3 (quoting Nancy 
Reagan’s famous “Just Say No” speech, which kick-started a new education campaign 
aimed at school-age children in the 1980’s). 
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caused a public health crisis, promoted crime, and hurt the economy.123 In 
response, the DEA has historically used the war on drugs to increase 
incarceration via mandatory minimum sentences for drugs offenses,124 
increase militarization of state and local law enforcement agencies against 
civilians,125 and allow an exponential increase in the use of civil forfeiture.126 
Though the Obama Administration backed away from some of the uglier 
aspects of the war on drugs such as mandatory minimum sentencing,127 it left 
much of the policy intact. 
A number of soft punishments are also collaterally attached to the 
CSA. This presents numerous adverse, life-altering criminal and civil 
sanctions for any individual who uses marijuana or is convicted of a 
marijuana offense. The individual may lose employment opportunities, 
unless employment protections are specifically listed in the state’s medical 
marijuana laws, and such laws cannot protect within the context of federal 
employment.128 
Public-housing agencies that receive federal assistance are also 
legally required to turn down or remove users of illegal drugs, including 
marijuana.129 The housing agency or owner has wide latitude to investigate 
possible drug activity and need only have “reasonable cause to believe” that 
                                                 
 123. See, e.g., OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
STRATEGY iii, 74 (2015). 
 124. In 2014 alone, 1,561,231 people were arrested for drug-related charges, nearly half 
of them involving marijuana. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, 
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014 2 (2015). As of 2015, 49.5% of all federal prisoners and 
15.7% of all state prisoners were serving sentences for drug offenses. E. ANN CARSON & 
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2015 14 tbl.9, 15 tbl.10 
(Dec. 2016). The U.S. prison population has risen from roughly 300,000 in 1978 to more 
than 1,500,000 in 2015, an increase of 500% during that time. Id. at 3 fig.2. 
 125. The Military Cooperation with Civilian Agencies Act of 1981 has been used 
heavily to allow for militarization of local police. Military Cooperation with Civilian 
Agencies Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-86, 95 Stat. 1099 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 271–84 
(2016)). The act allows the Department of Defense to provide “any equipment” without 
exception to law enforcement personnel for “counter-drug” activities. 10 U.S.C. §§ 272, 
281(a)(1) (2016). 
 126. Ford, Matt, The Bipartisan Opposition to Sessions’s New Civil-Forfeiture Rules, 
ATLANTIC, (July 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/G2VW-PVZ7. Attorney General Sessions has 
been a vocal proponent of the policy’s use, despite widespread, bipartisan condemnation of 
the program for constitutional and policy reasons. Id. According to a study by The 
Washington Post in 2015, civil forfeiture proceedings by federal and state law enforcement 
agencies accounted for more property losses nationwide than all burglaries during the same 
year. Ingraham supra note 88. 
 127. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to U.S. Att’ys 
& Assistant Att’y Gen. for Crim. Div. (Aug. 12, 2013) (available at https://perma.cc/JL6N-
PTCP. (relaxing mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines for U.S. attorneys prosecuting 
drug cases). 
 128. See sources cited supra note 84. Federal employees in certain categories and 
federal contractors may also be subject to random drug testing, which may subject them to 
loss of employment, or, in the case of a contractor, federal funding and grants. 50 U.S.C. 
§ 3343(b) (2015); 41 U.S.C. § 8102 (2016). 
 129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13661–13662 (2016). 
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illegal use is occurring and that such abuse “may interfere with the health, 
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.”130 
Additionally, individuals convicted of misdemeanors under the CSA 
“become ineligible” to receive federally-backed student loans.131 Finally, the 
individual is also subject to the qualification of their Second Amendment 
rights, as discussed in much greater depth in parts II and III. 
As the DEA’s parent agency, the DOJ is the main enforcement and 
prosecution mechanism for the CSA and sets policy regarding marijuana 
throughout the federal government. The Supreme Court has ruled that the 
DOJ retains “broad discretion” in determining whom to prosecute and that 
such decisions are “particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”132 Until 
recently, the DOJ used its broad discretion to prosecute all marijuana 
offenders and attempt to obtain the maximum sentence possible, even when 
marijuana had been legalized by the state.133 President Obama’s first term in 
office, however, brought changes in the form of an administration, which 
was, initially, much more sympathetic toward medical marijuana than its 
predecessor.134 Beginning in 2009, the DOJ utilized its prosecutorial 
discretion to issue new policies for states with comprehensive medical 
marijuana and full legalization programs, releasing three memoranda to 
publicly announce its enforcement priorities: the Ogden Memo,135 the Cole 
Memo,136 and the Cole Recreational Memo.137 
1. The Ogden Memo 
Bringing sweeping changes to federal marijuana policy, the Ogden 
Memo also brought to light a fundamental, and lightly-discussed, flaw in the 
federal government’s anti-drug strategy, stating that the DOJ had to make 
“efficient and rational use of its limited investigative and prosecutorial 
                                                 
 130. Id. § 13661(b)(1)(B). 
 131. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-238, DRUG OFFENDERS: VARIOUS 
FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF 
SELECTED BENEFITS 6 (2005). 
 132. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 
 133. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, supra note 127. 
 134. KATHERINE VAN WORMER & DIANE RAE DAVIS, ADDICTION TREATMENT 66 
(Cengage Learning, 4th ed., 2014) (describing the anti-marijuana efforts of President George 
W. Bush’s administration, including both “extravagant” prohibitionist propaganda and a 
fight against medical marijuana dispensaries). 
 135. Memorandum from David Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to 
selected U.S. Att’ys (Oct. 19, 2009) (available at https://perma.cc/SFD9-GS57) [hereinafter 
Ogden Memo]. 
 136. Memorandum from James Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to U.S. 
Att’ys (June 29, 2011) (available at https://perma.cc/MS9C-VP3M) [hereinafter Cole 
Memo]. 
 137. Memorandum from James Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to all U.S. 
Att’ys (August 29, 2013) (available at https://perma.cc/DKX7-NC7Y) [hereinafter Cole 
Recreational Memo]. 
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resources.”138 The DOJ indicated that while it would still prosecute 
“significant” drug traffickers as a “core priority,” the agency’s limited 
resources should not be expended on “individuals whose actions are in clear 
and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the 
medical use of marijuana.”139 The Ogden Memo did however note that seven 
types of conduct were federal enforcement priorities and would continue to 
be prosecuted, including the “unlawful possession or use of firearms.”140141 
The medical marijuana industry viewed the Ogden Memo as an 
about-face from prior DOJ policy and it was interpreted as a “green light to 
the open sale of marijuana” in states with medical regimes.142 This opinion 
extended to the press and general public as well. Following its publication, a 
front-page story about the Ogden Memo graced the New York Times 
reporting that “people who use marijuana for medical purposes and those 
who distribute it to them should not face federal prosecution, provided they 
act according to state law.”143 Suddenly, an influx of new qualified patients 
and dispensaries caused a backlash from critics of medical marijuana 
programs144 and led the DOJ to amend its guidance just two years later. 
2. The Cole Memo 
It appears the DOJ viewed the public and industry reaction to the 
Ogden Memo as an overreaction and unintended consequence that it 
attempted to rectify with publication of the Cole Memo.145 Principally, the 
Cole Memo reiterated the seven activities of interest detailed in the Ogden 
Memo and introduced a new distinction between qualified patients and 
“[p]ersons who are in the business” of producing and selling marijuana or 
                                                 
 138. Ogden Memo, supra note 135, at 1. 
 139. Id. at 1–2. 
 140. Id. at 2. This indicates conduct illegal under section 922(g)(3) of the Gun Control 
Act. 
 141. The other six types of conduct are “violence; sales to minors; financial and 
marketing activities inconsistent with the terms, conditions, or purposes of state law, 
including evidence of money laundering activity and/or financial gains or excessive amounts 
of cash inconsistent with purported compliance with state or local law; amounts of marijuana 
inconsistent with purported compliance with state or local law; illegal possession or sale of 
other controlled substances; or ties to other criminal enterprises.” Id. at 2. 
 142. Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 869, 881 (2013). Following publication of the Ogden Memo, National Public Radio 
reported that more medical marijuana dispensaries were open in California than Starbucks, 
and a Colorado-based magazine reported that the number of medical marijuana applicants 
increased by more than 1,000 per week. Id. at 881 n.51. 
 143. David Stout & Solomon Moore, U.S. Won’t Prosecute in States that Allow 
Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2009), https://perma.cc/TJY6-LMZL. 
 144. See Caplan, supra note 6, at 127, 129–38 (describing both the influx of qualified 
patients and dispensaries to states with legalized medical marijuana regimes and critical 
responses both by local individuals and the author). 
 145. Cole Memo, supra note 136, at 1. 
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who “facilitate such activities.”146 Oddly, the Cole Memo stated that the 
Ogden Memo “was never intended to shield such activities from federal 
enforcement action or prosecution, even where those activities purport to 
comply with state law.”147 
It has been argued that the DOJ’s reasoning and response in the Cole 
Memo was justified148 because the Ogden Memo did contain caveats relating 
to enforcement against private businesses.149 While it is true that the Ogden 
Memo did state that commercial enterprises could be prosecuted even if 
working legally within state laws,150 this language was not clearly conveyed 
to the public, the media, or even within the legal system. To the contrary, 
public commentary about the memo by the Obama Administration created a 
“difficult ethical problem” for the DOJ.151 Following the enthusiastic 
response to the Ogden Memo, the Obama Administration made no attempts 
to rectify what it apparently considered a common misconception, with the 
DOJ even dismissing one case against a California dispensary as moot due 
to the memo’s guidance.152 This sentiment was echoed by numerous 
defendants who were arrested and prosecuted153 as enforcement ramped up 
surrounding the publication of the Cole Memo.154 To confuse matters further, 
the DOJ amended its guidance again with the publication of a third memo. 
                                                 
 146. Id. at 2. 
 147. Id. This would appear to contradict both the wording and implication of the prior 
memo. Ogen Memo, supra note 135, at 1-2. 
 148. See Kamin & Wald, supra note 142, at 882 (stating that a “close reading of the 
Ogden Memo shows that the optimistic interpretation of those who rushed into the marijuana 
business in 2009 was either careless or delusional” and that there were “clear warnings about 
the continued viability of the CSA”). 
 149. Ogden Memo, supra note 135, at 1–2. Specifically, the memo stated that the 
“disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks” and “prosecution of 
commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana” were still prosecutorial 
priorities for the agency. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2. 
 151. Alex Kreit, Reflections on Medical Marijuana Prosecutions and the Duty to Seek 
Justice, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 1027, 1036 (2012). 
 152. Kreit notes that the Obama Administration never made any public attempt to 
delineate between qualified patients and dispensaries because Obama, while campaigning 
for president in 2008, promised that, under his administration, the DOJ would leave the issue 
of medical marijuana to the states and Attorney General Eric Holder reiterated this position 
on numerous occasions, going so far as stating that “the policy is to go after those people 
who violate both federal and state law.” Id. at 1036–37. Further, after seeing the public and 
industry interpretation of the Ogden Memo, the Obama Administration made no efforts to 
contest this interpretation publicly. Id. at 1037–38. 
 153. See Mont. Caregivers Ass’n, LLC v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1148 
(D. Mont. 2012); United States v. Washington, 887 F Supp. 2d 1077, 1090–91 (D. Mont. 
2012); United States v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
 154. Kamin & Wald, supra note 142, at 883–84 (stating that DOJ enforcement 
increased in 2011 in comprehensive medical marijuana state including California, 
Washington, Colorado, and Montana as a result of the Cole Memo). Following the 
publication of the Cole Memo, the Obama DOJ appears to have taken a harsher stance on 
medical marijuana raids than even George W. Bush’s DOJ, which became an issue of 
contention during his 2012 re-election campaign. Kreit, supra note 151, at 1039; see Tim 
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3. The Cole Recreational Memo 
In 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize 
the recreational use of marijuana. Though the Cole Recreational Memo 
largely addresses issues outside the scope of this Article, it does contain 
notable and crucial policy changes from its predecessors. At the outset, the 
DOJ reiterated the seven activities it considered to be its highest enforcement 
priorities and stated that it would step in to prosecute individuals if it felt that 
“state enforcement efforts [were] not sufficiently robust.”155 The Cole 
Recreational Memo also set out two new pieces of guidance. First, the DOJ 
instructed federal agencies and authorities to avoid consideration of the “size 
or commercial nature of the marijuana operation alone as a proxy for 
assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the [DOJ’s] enforcement 
priorities.”156 Second, it appeared to carve out an exception for states with 
well-regulated marijuana programs, stating “the existence of a strong and 
effective state regulatory system, and an operation’s compliance . . . may 
allay the threat that an operation’s size poses to federal enforcement 
interests.”157 
The Cole Recreational Memo appears to have been the DOJ’s 
attempt to find a middle-ground between the Ogden and Cole memos and 
resolve the conflicts created by their conflicting policies.158 Essentially, the 
DOJ stated that if individual conduct did not fall within the seven 
enforcement priorities it previously reiterated, it would leave enforcement as 
a state matter.159 The DOJ also inserted caveats regarding dispensaries and 
cultivation centers, stating that they could still run afoul of federal law, thus 
being subject to prosecution.160 The status of these three memos is now in 
question due to new enforcement guidelines recently issued under President 
Donald Trump. 
4. The Sessions Enforcement Memo 
In early 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions published a new memo 
containing guidance outlining the drastically-altered marijuana enforcement 
priorities of the Trump Administration.161 Sessions, a long-time anti-
                                                 
Dickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, ROLLING STONE, (Feb. 16, 2012), https://perma.cc/9LEJ-
JF9K. 
 155. Cole Recreational Memo, supra note 137, at 1–3. 
 156. Id. at 3. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Melanie Reid, The Quagmire that Nobody in the Federal Government Wants to 
Talk About: Marijuana, 44 N.M.L. Rev. 169, 179 (2014). 
 159. Cole Recreational Memo, supra note 137, at 3. 
 160. Id. at 3–4. 
 161. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to all 
U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018) (https://perma.cc/G2VK-37TR) [hereinafter Sessions Enforcement 
Memo]. 
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marijuana crusader, has long sought methods to end marijuana legalization 
so that users and providers may be jailed under federal law, even going so far 
as to personally ask that members of Congress repeal the Rohrabacher-Farr 
Amendment.162 Specifically, the Session Enforcement Memo rescinds 
“previous nationwide guidance specific to marijuana enforcement” prepared 
by the DOJ under the Obama Administration, which includes the Ogden, 
Cole, and Cole Recreational memos.163 Further, Sessions reiterated that the 
DOJ maintains that “marijuana is a dangerous drug and that marijuana 
activity is a serious crime.”164 In statements accompanying its publication, 
Sessions indicated that, contrary to previous DOJ guidance that created 
certain safe harbors, this memo “does not have safe harbors in it.”165 
However, the memo does not currently have the force that Sessions implies. 
Within the context of recreational legalization, the Sessions 
Enforcement Memo is being viewed as a means of cracking down on existing 
recreational programs, participants, and future legalization efforts,166 though 
it is too early to know if this guidance will have the desired effect. In medical 
marijuana states however, the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment largely 
prevents the DOJ from taking action against qualified patients or suppliers.167 
Further, it may be argued that by publishing the memo, the DOJ has violated 
Rohrabacher-Farr under even the most strident interpretations offered by 
federal courts.168 
5. The Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment 
On December 16, 2014, the Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriation Act of 2015, which included the Rohrabacher-Farr 
                                                 
 162. Christopher Ingraham, Jeff Sessions Personally Asked Congress to Let Him 
Prosecute Medical-Marijuana Providers, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/W3DP-NJ4W; see also Rachel Revesz, Jeff Sessions, Donald Trump’s New 
Attorney General, Said the Ku Klux Klan ‘Was OK Until I Found Out They Smoked Pot,’ 
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 18, 2016, 6:12 PM), https://perma.cc/27TC-ZY8M. 
 163. Sessions Enforcement Memo, supra note 161, at 1 & n.1. 
 164. Id. at 1. 
 165. Jeff Sessions Ends Policy That Let Legal Pot Flourish, CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018, 
2:47 PM), https://perma.cc/4PKN-KZFM. 
 166. Matt Zapotsky, Sari Horwitz & Joel Achenbach, Use of Legalized Marijuana 
Threatened as Sessions Rescinds Obama-era Directive That Eased Federal Enforcement, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/H4G6-VUDW. 
 167. See sources cited and accompanying text infra notes 169, 183–89. 
 168. The Sessions Enforcement Memo will result in less participation in recreational 
and medical marijuana programs—that was part of the overall point behind its publication. 
But, because the purpose and effect of the memo were to halt the implementation of medical 
marijuana programs in existing and future states, without evidence that the action was 
undertaken using no congressional funding, it appears that the DOJ may have violated 
Rohrabacher-Farr by releasing the memo. See supra notes 162, 166; see also infra notes 
382-84. 
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Amendment was signed into law.169 The amendment requires, without 
exception, that the DOJ is precluded from using any “funds made available 
in this Act,” meaning all funding available to the DOJ, “to prevent such States 
from implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, 
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”170 It should be noted that 
the “States” refers not only to those states that have enacted comprehensive 
medical marijuana programs, but also to others that allow only low-THC or 
CBD products, creating an even greater zone of exclusion for the DOJ.171 On 
its face, the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment172 is a stunning piece of 
legislation, given the current political climate and the usual deference paid to 
law enforcement in America. It is an amendment that passed Congress with 
bipartisan support, forbidding the DOJ, and its subsidiary agencies, from 
enforcing any laws—not just the CSA—that would prevent states from 
implementing or furthering their medical marijuana regimes.173 
Initial implementation of the Amendment would prove difficult, 
however. The DOJ’s response was to continue its business as usual, utilizing 
the guidance provided in the Ogden, Cole, and Cole Recreational memos.174 
The DOJ interpreted Rohrabacher-Farr to mean that it could still pursue 
qualified patients and private distributors, but not state actors who were off 
limits, because to arrest or prosecute those individuals would prevent state 
implementation.175 The authors of the Amendment viewed this as a brazen 
attempt to skirt both the letter and the spirit the law and sent a demand letter 
                                                 
 169. Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat. 2130 § 538 (2014). 
 170. Id. § 538, 128 Stat. at 2217. See also id. at Title II, 128 Stat. at 2182 (listing the 
operating budget of the DOJ). The Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment enumerated the 33 states 
where comprehensive and low-THC medical marijuana programs had been created at the 
time. Id. § 538, 128 Stat. at 2217. 
 171. Id. § 538, 128 Stat. at 2217; see also supra note 33; see also infra Appendix, Table 
1. 
 172. The amendment was originally named for U.S. Representatives Dana Rohrabacher 
(Republican) and Sam Farr (Democrat). Following the retirement of Rep. Farr in January 
2017, it was renamed the “Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment” after new co-sponsor 
Rep. Earl Blumenhauer (Dem.). Alicia Wallace, 44 in Congress Support Effort to Keep DOJ 
Handcuffed in Medical Cannabis States, THE CANNABIST, Apr. 10, 2017, 
https://perma.cc/HM4R-7TXU. 
 173. See Voting Record for Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, https://perma.cc/2CCA-
3YH5 (last visited July 8, 2018); Pub. L. No. 113-235 § 538, 128 Stat. at 2217 (prohibiting 
the use of any funds to prevent the enumerated states from “implementing their own laws 
that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana”). 
 174. Health Center from Dana Rohrabacher, United States House of Representatives 
(May 5, 2016) (available at https://perma.cc/8CFJ-73SP; Jacob Sullum, Would The 
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment Actually Stop Medical Marijuana Raids?, FORBES (June 3, 
2014, 6:52 PM), https://perma.cc/GT7B-EADL (noting that a hypothetical DEA arrest of a 
medical marijuana patient would not technically prohibit a state from implementing its own 
laws regarding medical marijuana use). 
 175. David Downs, Updated: War on California Medical Marijuana Will Continue, 
Justice Department Says, EAST BAY EXPRESS (April 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/D48W-
PUDN. 
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to the DOJ, informing the agency that its interpretation was “emphatically 
wrong.”176 The demand letter further alleged that the DOJ, tasked with 
prosecuting federal laws, was itself violating federal law by undertaking an 
action against a dispensary or qualified patient “acting in accordance with 
state medical marijuana laws.”177 This did not sway the DOJ, which 
continued to operate much as it had previously, essentially ignoring the 
demand letter and subsequent request for investigation until federal courts 
stepped in. 
The first court to have a say in the matter was the Northern District 
of California in United States v. Marin Alliance.178 The DOJ argued that the 
funds described in the Amendment are not the same as those used by the 
agency for “CSA enforcement actions against individuals or private 
businesses because such actions do not prevent a State from implementing 
its own laws.”179 The agency additionally argued that its prosecutions were a 
mere “drop-in-the-bucket” that did not present any real impediment to 
California’s implementation of its program.180 The district court was 
unimpressed, holding that an “impermissible government intrusion” is not 
rendered acceptable simply because “any one defendant is a small piece of 
the legal landscape.”181 The district court went on to hold that all forms of 
statutory interpretation argued against the DOJ’s position and was frank in 
its assessment of the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, stating, 
Section 538 either allows the DOJ to shut down medical 
marijuana dispensaries for violating the CSA, or it does not. 
It contains no limitation that requires a State to implement 
its medical marijuana laws in one way or not another—via 
centralized state dispensary, for example, or through highly 
regulated local private dispensaries—before Section 538’s 
prohibition is triggered. Rather, Section 538 takes as a given 
that States implement their medical marijuana laws in the 
ways they see fit.182 
                                                 
 176. Letter from Dana Rohrabacher & Sam Farr, Members of Cong., to Eric Holder, 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. 1 (April 8, 2015) (available at https://perma.cc/4E86-RUKC). 
 177. Id. at 2. After the DOJ failed to comply with the initial letter sent on April 8, 2015, 
representatives Rohrabacher and Farr called for a formal investigation of the DOJ by the 
Inspector General for admitted, flagrant violations of federal law. Letter from Sam Farr & 
Dana Rohrabacher, Members of Cong., to Inspector Gen. Michael Horowitz (July 30, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/D72D-R96Z. 
 178. United States v. Marin All., 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1046–1047 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 179. Id. at 1044 (quoting Gov’t Supp. Brief at 6 & n.2 (dkt.272)). 
 180. See id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1044–45. 
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The district court did note that the scope of each state’s laws imposed limits 
on Rohrabacher-Farr, but any individual or private enterprise acting within 
those parameters was outside the DOJ’s reach.183 
Following Marin Alliance, the DOJ received another loss, this time 
before the Ninth Circuit in United States v. McIntosh.184 In a sweeping ruling 
that affects every enforcement action the DOJ undertakes with regard to 
medical marijuana laws, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Rohrabacher-
Farr Amendment “prohibits DOJ from spending money on actions that 
prevent the Medical Marijuana States’ giving practical effect to their state 
laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical 
marijuana.”185 The court then turned its analysis to individuals acting under 
state medical marijuana laws. The court acknowledged that the DOJ may 
prosecute individuals for violations of the CSA, but doing so prevents “the 
state from giving practical effect to its law,” regardless of whether state 
officials are the targets of prosecution, because “state law provides for non-
prosecution of individuals who engage in such conduct.”186 
The court then moved to the more difficult question of scope, though 
the difficulty arises from the variable nature of state laws, not federal.187 Due 
to the wording of the Amendment, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the DOJ 
is prohibited from “preventing the implementation of those specific rules of 
state law that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of 
medical marijuana” but may prosecute those individuals who “do not strictly 
comply with all state-law conditions.”188 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion made it 
clear that the DOJ was faced with a choice in forming its CSA enforcement 
strategy. Although Congress stripped the DOJ of funding to impede medical 
marijuana regimes, the DOJ could, theoretically, enforce federal marijuana 
laws, provided the agency could also furnish some form of proof showing 
that none of its congressional funding was expended therein.189 
A plain reading of the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment along with the 
holdings of both Marin Alliance and McIntosh makes it apparent that the DOJ 
and its subsidiary agencies, such as the DEA and the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”), are currently precluded from investigating, 
arresting, or prosecuting any participant that is acting in strict compliance 
                                                 
 183. See id. at 1047 (gathering cases). 
 184. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 185. Id. at 1176. 
 186. Id. at 1176–77. 
 187. Id. at 1177–78. The court demurred at adopting the defendants’ expansive reading 
of the Amendment, which would have required DOJ to “refrain from prosecuting ‘unless a 
person’s activities are so clearly outside the scope of a state’s medical marijuana laws that 
reasonable debate is not possible.’” Id. at 1177. 
 188. Id. at 1178 (emphasis added). 
 189. Id. at 1179. Of course, such a showing would be difficult, if not impossible to 
make in good faith, and, assuming it, would require the agency to run a deficit and likely 
lead to slower prosecution, thus to possible Sixth Amendment constitutional violations. 
Conversely, the DOJ could comply with federal law as it now stands. 
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with state medical marijuana laws. Thus it seems that qualified patients have 
won a monumental victory against the federal government, though it may be 
transitory in nature for two reasons. First, Attorney General Sessions has 
actively attempted to have Rohrabacher-Farr repealed in future spending 
measures as part of his ongoing crusade against marijuana.190 Second, 
because Rohrabacher-Farr was implemented as a rider, it must be 
reauthorized by Congress or it will become ineffective and thus cease to 
protect medical marijuana regimes and participants, effectively granting 
Sessions the enforcement latitude he seeks.191 Currently, the Rohrabacher-
Farr Amendment has been reauthorized through September 30, 2018, though 
its long-term prospects are being hotly debated.192193 Thus the reality for any 
qualified patient is that, while she may be protected by medical marijuana 
laws, she is still violating federal law and subject to the actions of a DOJ keen 
to enforce the CSA. 
II. SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
This Part addresses the current state of Second Amendment 
jurisprudence in America, its application in a post-Heller world, and its 
intersection with the qualified patient. Section A describes the confusing and 
somewhat unhelpful text of the majority’s decision in Heller as a necessary 
prerequisite for further discussion of individual category qualification. 
Section B discusses the two-part qualification analysis that federal circuit 
courts created to fill the void left by Heller. Section B also briefly describes 
application of the qualification analysis as applied to individuals adjudicated 
as mentally-ill and users of illegal drugs as well as recent policy provided by 
the ATF to federal firearms dealers. 
Although it was not the first piece of legislation to qualify the right 
to bear arms at the federal level,194 the Gun Control Act, enacted in 1968, is 
the federal government’s predominant means of qualification today and 
                                                 
 190. See Ingraham, supra note 162. 
 191. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113 § 542, 129 Stat. 
2242, 2332–33 (2015). 
 192. The Amendment was subsequently extended via a spending stopgap bill that 
extended all funding levels until January 19, 2018 but did not resolve issues between the 
parties. Alex Pasquariello, Trump Signs Stopgap Spending Bill Extending Federal Medical 
Marijuana Protections a Few More Weeks, CANNABIST, (Dec. 22, 2017, 11:07 AM), 
https://perma.cc/Q8WK-SLWH. Rohrabacher-Farr’s future is undecided, however, as the 
House Rules Committee removed it from consideration for the 2018 funding bill, but the 
Senate Appropriations Committee had previously included the language. Alicia Wallace, 
Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Medical Marijuana Protections Extended by Debt Limit Deal, 
CANNABIST (Sept. 8, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://perma.cc/2FVC-QPYB. 
 193. As of this writing, the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment has been extended to 
September 30, 2018. Senators Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Protect State Marijuana 
Laws, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT (last updated June 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/67DF-
UTSU. 
 194. See sources cited infra notes 310, 319. 
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made firearms possession unlawful for individuals convicted of any felony, 
unlawful aliens, any user of or person addicted to “marihuana,”195 and any 
person who had been “adjudicated as a mental defective.”196 
A. An Awkward Landmark Decision 
District of Columbia v. Heller is a momentous case that radically 
changed the reading of the Second Amendment for federal courts.197 It is well 
beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the factual background of the case, 
as we are instead much more concerned with its consequences, both intended 
and otherwise. 
For the purpose of this Article’s analysis, Heller can be divided into 
two unequal sections, with only the second being applicable. The first, 
consisting of the decision’s initial 56 pages is a textual analysis of the Second 
Amendment’s prefatory and operative clauses, and its post-ratification 
commentaries.198 The second, comprising the final nine pages, provides the 
only guidance for a ruling that would completely alter one of, if not the most, 
contentious constitutional and political questions of recent times.199 
The ruling’s second section also contains its only discussion of 
qualification of the newly-expanded right to bear arms where the majority 
noted that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by Second Amendment is not 
unlimited.”200 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, would cause no small 
amount of discussion and disagreement for federal courts in the years 
following the decision, in stating that “nothing in our opinion should be taken 
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill,” which the Court described as “presumptively 
lawful.”201 These two specifically-named individual category qualifications 
form the so-called constitutional safe harbor.202 
                                                 
 195. Spelling “marijuana” with an “h” instead of a “j” is now commonly viewed as both 
“archaic” and racially insensitive in academic circles as it hearkens back to early 20th 
century attempts by prohibitionists to tie marijuana to “despised minority groups” such as 
Mexican immigrants by virtue of a spelling that would “sound Mexican.” Christopher 
Ingraham, ‘Marijuana’ or ‘Marihuana’? It’s All Weed to the DEA, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 
2016), https://perma.cc/LK6N-R9JL. Despite these connotations, the DEA continues to use 
the outmoded spelling, even as recently as December 2016. Id. 
 196. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922(d)(4), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2017)). 
 197. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 104–07 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(noting that every federal circuit court save one rejected the notion that an individual right to 
bear arms existed untied to military or militia service, with the Fifth Circuit being the lone 
exception). 
 198. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570–626 (2008). 
 199. See id. at 626–36. 
 200. Id. at 626. 
 201. Id. at 626–27 & n.26. 
 202. See sources cited infra notes 218, 220–21. 
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Before closing, Justice Scalia noted his disdain for Justice Breyer’s 
dissent, particularly the suggestion that the Court should “establish a level of 
scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions” either via the 
traditional scrutiny tests or an “‘interest-balancing’ approach.”203 Justice 
Breyer’s interest-balancing approach, perhaps, rather presciently, would 
have required courts to evaluate “the interests protected by the Second 
Amendment on one side and government public-safety concerns on the 
other” with the sole issue being “whether the regulation at issue 
impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter.”204 
Justice Scalia viewed any such approach as a blatant constitutional end-
around, meant to avoid his originalist interpretation of the Second 
Amendment.205 This majority admitted, however, that it left “so many 
applications of the right to keep and bears arms in doubt.”206 
Justice Breyer would lose the day, as his argument was relegated to 
a dissent,207 but history appears to have proven him the most prescient of the 
justices from the Heller decision, at least in the short-term.208 The interest-
balancing approach described in his dissent is quite similar to that which is 
used by federal courts to rule on Second Amendment cases today, and he 
correctly surmised that the majority’s decision would “encourage legal 
challenges to gun regulation throughout the Nation.”209 
B. The Post-Heller Two-Step Qualification Analysis 
Following Heller, Americans have, for the first time, a fundamental 
right to possess firearms for the “core lawful purpose of self-defense.”210 Yet, 
the decision failed to create a test to decide the “who, what, where, when, 
and why”211 of qualification under the Gun Control Act. Indeed, the Seventh 
Circuit would later hold that the Supreme Court “resolved the Second 
Amendment challenge in Heller without specifying any doctrinal ‘test’ for 
resolving future claims.”212 By failing to enunciate any standard of review, 
the Supreme Court left gaps to be filled by the various judicially-imposed 
approaches the majority had sought to avoid. 
                                                 
 203. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
 204. Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.B. 
 205. Id. at 634–35 (citing Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)). 
 206. Id. at 635. 
 207. Id. at 681–723 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 208. See, e.g., Violence Policy Ctr., U.S. Gun Death Rate Jumps 17 Percent Since 2008 
Supreme Court District of Columbia v. Heller Decision Affirming Right to Own a Handgun 
for Self-Defense (Jan. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/AT8V-B4Q2. 
 209. Heller, 554 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id. at 630. 
 211. United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 212. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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In the absence of specific direction, the Third Circuit created a 
patchwork two-part test,213 which was subsequently adopted by all federal 
circuit courts, though its application varies to some degree.214 When a federal 
firearms qualification is challenged, the court will analyze the regulation by 
asking two questions. First, the court asks “whether the challenged law 
burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment.”215 If the court 
answers in the affirmative, it will then proceed to the second step and ask: 
Does the regulation in question pass “muster under any appropriate level of 
scrutiny?”216 The circuits do differ in their treatment if the answer to the first 
question is not an unequivocal “yes.” Many will end the inquiry there, 
allowing the qualification to stand, though others appear to view such an 
action as incautious and allow the inquiry to proceed to the second step.217 
Initially, the first step appears to be a simple proposition involving a 
brief restatement of the statutory context for the regulation in question. The 
difficulty is multiplied, however, when the analysis attempts to compare the 
qualification in question with the possible constitutional safe harbor named 
in Heller218 or measure whether a regulation is “longstanding” and 
“presumptively lawful.”219 Federal circuit courts are split in regard to the 
existence of a constitutional safe harbor, or initial presumption of validity, 
for the two individual category qualifications named in Heller: those 
restricting firearm ownership by felons and individuals adjudicated as 
                                                 
 213. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d. Cir. 2010). 
 214. See Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d 332, 347–48 n.9 (1st. Cir. 2015) (gathering 
cases from every other federal circuit court, save the Eleventh Circuit, utilizing the post-
Heller two-step process). The Eleventh Circuit has since adopted this framework as well. 
See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 788 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 
2015). 
 215. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States 
v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)). Some circuits alter the first question to add 
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context for the qualification. See Jackson v. City & Cty. Of S.F., 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 
2014) (amending the language in Chovan to add “based on a ‘historical understanding of the 
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protected’”) (citations omitted); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(citing Chester, 628 F.3d at 680). 
 216. GeorgiaCarry.Org, 788 F.3d at 1324. 
 217. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the 
court is not “obliged to impart a definitive ruling at the first step” and may proceed to the 
second step when such a move is deemed “prudent” (citing Nat’l Rifle Ass’n. of Am. v. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012)); 
United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 123–24 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 218. See Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and 
McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1142–44 (2011) (discussing the safe harbor question in 
greater depth). 
 219. Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s “Schools” and 
“Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. 537, 562–64 (2014) (describing the varying 
approaches and opinions, even amongst federal courts, to such regulations). 
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mentally-ill.220 The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has ruled that qualifications 
against felons are presumptively valid and fall within a constitutional safe 
harbor, meaning challenges to the qualification are almost certain to fail.221 
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has found that no safe harbor exists and has 
instead used the two-step process to find felon-in-possession statutes 
constitutional after applying intermediate scrutiny analysis.222 The Sixth 
Circuit goes further still, holding that the use of the Supreme Court’s list to 
find a safe harbor too closely approximates rational-basis review, which was 
expressly rejected as a means of review for Second Amendment cases by 
Heller.223 
Prior to venturing beyond step one, federal courts may make another 
inquiry, taken from the text of Heller, which asks whether the individual 
category qualification is “longstanding”224 and “presumptively lawful.”225 
An affirmative answer will end the two-step test altogether in some courts,226 
while others consider the question to be useful, though not dispositive.227 
Again, much of the confusion appears to have been caused by the text of 
Heller. Though Justice Scalia stated that the individual category 
qualifications against both felons and those adjudicated as mentally-ill were 
“longstanding,” such regulations were not codified federally in their current 
form until 1968.228 Even if we assume that these two qualifications are 
unquestionably valid, this raises an additional question: Why did the Court 
single out these two as longstanding and not the others? Further, the phrase 
“presumptively lawful” is taken from a footnote,229 which has led some 
defendants and even federal courts to argue it is dicta,230 creating more 
confusion. Finally, it may also be argued that questions regarding 
                                                 
 220. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 221. See United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 2016); Chovan, 735 
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 229. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 n.26. 
 230. See Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 
1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). Conversely, the Fifth Circuit Court has specifically described the 
phrase as dicta, though it still upheld the felon-in-possession qualification as previously 
precedential within the circuit. United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(citing United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
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longstanding and presumptive validity or constitutional safe harbors only 
apply to facial challenges to the Gun Control Act because as-applied 
challenges are based on the individual’s particular set of circumstances, thus 
rendering such distinctions inappropriate where situations warrant.231 
Based on these numerous questions, each with no good or final 
answers, it is probably best to approach the first step utilizing the Seventh 
Circuit’s observation that it is not “profitable to parse these passages of 
Heller as if they contained an answer to the question.”232 If the court finds 
the first step has been met, or it defers, the test moves on. 
The second step requires the court to analyze the qualification in 
question using one of the three constitutional standards of review: rational 
basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.233 While this Article does note 
some shortcomings of the Heller decision, the Court did limit review by 
rejecting rational basis review of Second Amendment rights and stated that 
if rational basis was “all that was required to overcome the right to keep and 
bear arms . . . the Second Amendment . . . would have no effect.”234 Federal 
circuit courts have also held that Heller provided guidance in regard to the 
use of intermediate or strict scrutiny analysis by comparing constitutional 
evaluations of First and Second Amendment rights.235 
As such, federal courts treat scrutiny analysis of Second Amendment 
rights in much the same manner that they do for First Amendment rights. 
Within the context of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that 
strict scrutiny analysis is applicable to any law which seeks to regulate the 
content of a message.236 Intermediate scrutiny analysis, on the other hand, 
applies to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech.237 
Applying this reasoning to Second Amendment jurisprudence, courts have 
ruled that strict scrutiny analysis should apply to “any law that would burden 
the ‘fundamental,’ core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding 
citizen.”238 However, once qualification moves to conduct outside the home, 
those regulations are measured via intermediate scrutiny analysis.239 The 
reason behind narrow, strict scrutiny application in the context of the Second 
                                                 
 231. See also Carly Lagrotteria, Note, Heller’s Collateral Damage: As-Applied 
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Amendment is due to the “inherent risks to others” posed by possessing 
firearms in public.240 
The Seventh Circuit is the lone federal circuit to substantively alter 
post-Heller qualification analysis. Like its sister circuits, the Seventh follows 
the first step, but diverges at the second. There, the Seventh looks to the type 
of qualification in question to determine what level of scrutiny to use. If it is 
total in nature where “law-abiding, responsible citizens” would regularly be 
entitled to full solicitude, it will apply strict scrutiny.241 Whereas, if the 
qualification is categorical in nature, such as the law preventing convicted 
domestic abuser from possessing firearms, the Seventh Circuit will require 
the government to make a “form of strong showing” similar to intermediate 
scrutiny.242 The stated reasoning for this is that the court does not wish to 
become mired in the “‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.”243 
Once the level of scrutiny has been established, the government must 
provide enough evidence to meet the burden of proof. In cases challenging 
individual category qualifications under intermediate scrutiny, the amount is 
determined by reference to the length and breadth of the “temporal 
limitation” imposed. Courts have routinely held that users of illegal drugs are 
subject to a “limited temporal reach,” meaning the limitation can be removed 
at any time by the individual ceasing her illegal conduct,244 while felons and 
individuals adjudicated as mentally-ill experience permanent temporal 
limitations because they cannot obtain relief from this disability.245 
Currently, no hard-and-fast rule exists calculating the amount of evidence 
required, however, the Supreme Court has held that the amount will “vary up 
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”246 This 
language has been interpreted to mean that a permanent temporal limitation 
requires a greater evidentiary showing than one that is temporary in nature.247 
The government may offer numerous types of evidence to meet its burden, 
“including legislative history, empirical evidence, case law, and even 
common sense, but it may not rely upon mere anecdote and supposition.”248 
Enacted by Congress in 1968, the Gun Control Act originally 
allowed individuals who had previously been subject to qualification and 
later had their civil rights restored under federal law to petition for restoration 
of their Second Amendment rights under the relief-from-disabilities 
                                                 
 240. Id. 
 241. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 242. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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provision.249 In 1992, however, Congress passed an appropriations act, which 
contained a rider requiring that “none of the funds appropriated herein shall 
be available to investigate or act upon applications for relief . . . under 18 
U.S.C. 925(c).”250 That provision prohibits the ATF from expending funds to 
review applications for relief from federal firearms qualification and has been 
subsequently reauthorized by Congress annually.251 Congress later renewed 
a wholly-voluntary, federally-funded, state-run relief-from-disabilities 
program that applied solely to individuals adjudicated as mentally-ill, though 
only 31 states had done so in 2016.252 
1. Individuals Adjudicated as Mentally-Ill 
The Gun Control Act permanently qualifies the Second Amendment 
rights of any individual who has been “adjudicated as a mental defective or 
who has been committed to a mental institution,” with limited exceptions.253 
Though these individuals are viewed similar to felons due to the language of 
Heller, challenges to this provision of the Gun Control Act are much less 
frequent254 and are treated much differently. Because the Gun Control Act 
does not define “committed to a mental institution,” federal courts must rely 
on state definitions in many cases.255 Further, the technical and factual 
minutiae of these cases are closely scrutinized, as voluntary and temporary 
committal does not qualify as commitment.256 It is interesting then that a 
recent Sixth Circuit case provides a roadmap for showing that a qualification, 
even one that is longstanding and presumptively lawful, may be found 
unconstitutional, even under intermediate scrutiny analysis. 
In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sherriff’s Department, an individual 
unsuccessfully attempted to purchase a firearm in 2011 due to disclosing an 
involuntary commitment to an in-patient mental health evaluation center in 
                                                 
 249. See 18 U.S.C. § 925 (2016). 
 250. The Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, 
Pub L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (1992). 
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1986.257 Tyler left the hospital of his own volition and psychiatrists later 
testified that during a 2012 psychological evaluation, he reported “never” 
experiencing a subsequent depressive episode and was observed to show “no 
signs of mental illness.”258 Tyler sued numerous government officials for as-
applied violations of his Second Amendment rights after he was denied the 
purchase of a firearm by a federal dealer.259 The Sixth Circuit applied the 
post-Heller two-step process and intermediate scrutiny analysis.260 
The majority found that although Congress has an important 
government interest in keeping firearms away from “presumptively risky 
people,” Tyler’s constitutional rights had still been violated.261 Further, the 
court ruled that while the government’s interest was of utmost importance, 
the restriction used was not a reasonable fit to that objective.262 In order to 
pass intermediate scrutiny, the government was required to show that there 
was a “continued risk presented by people who were involuntarily committed 
many years ago and who have no history of intervening mental illness, 
criminal activity, or substance abuse” but without doing so, the court had “no 
way of knowing” if the ban was only “‘somewhat over-inclusive’ or if it is 
much more so.”263 The government’s “biggest problem,” however, was the 
change made by Congress allowing relief-from-disability for some 
individuals adjudicated as mentally-ill, which the court viewed as an implicit 
statement from Congress that it did not consider those individuals to be more 
dangerous than the public.264 The government’s case also failed due to its 
inability to back its contentions via longitudinal evidence specific to 
individuals like Tyler.265 The majority was sympathetic to the government’s 
concerns and possible public dangers but held that the federal government 
could not satisfactorily assert that a permanent temporal limitation on the 
possession of firearms was reasonably necessary, at least in the case of an 
individual like Tyler.266 
The government argued that formerly committed individuals are 
more dangerous than the general public using a number of studies as 
evidence, but the court ruled that none were applicable to Tyler and were 
                                                 
 257. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 684. 
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therefore anecdotal, at best.267 The Sixth Circuit reviewed the studies but 
found that, “without any longitudinal evidence documenting that previously 
committed people, on average, pose a greater threat of violence than 
members of the general public,” the government did not meet its burden 
under intermediate scrutiny analysis.268 
2. Users of Illegal Drugs 
The Gun Control Act also makes it illegal for any individual who 
uses or is addicted to illegal drugs to possess a firearm.269 The federal 
government, meanwhile, asserts that because users of illegal drugs are more 
violent than the general population—according to Congress—those 
individuals should have their right to bear arms qualified.270 This is known 
as the “psychopharmacological model of violence” theory, which posits that 
“ingesting a psychoactive substance. . . . may lead to a volatile, unrestrained 
state that precipitates a violent act.”271 Similar to other individual category 
qualifications, federal circuit courts have unanimously found section 
922(g)(3) to be constitutional, though they differ as to the amount of evidence 
the federal government must produce.272 The Fourth Circuit, remanded a case 
in order to allow the parties to “substantiate the fit between [section] 
922(g)(3) and the government’s important interest in protecting the 
community from gun violence”273 using scientific studies. When reviewing 
these challenges, some federal courts appear loathe to differentiate between 
the various types of illegal drugs the individual used or is alleged to have 
used, even where marijuana is not the sole drug in question.274 And this is not 
                                                 
 267. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 694–97. 
 268. Id. at 698. 
 269. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2017). 
 270. See Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Carter (Carter II), 750 F.3d 462, 463–64 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 
681, 686 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 271. Carrie B. Oser et al., The Drugs Violence Nexus Among Rural Felony 
Probationers, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1285, 1286–87 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 272. Numerous courts have held the provision to be constitutional, seemingly without 
evidence. See United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Richard, 350 F. App’x 
252, 260 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 273. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 463–64. 
 274. The Fourth Circuit, for example, stated it was under no requirement to make a 
“particularized demonstration” specifically regarding marijuana use and violence after 
finding ruling all drugs users are more violent than the general public based upon scientific 
studies and government surveys that did not differentiate between cocaine and marijuana 
users. Id. at 467–70. Regardless of personal opinion on the subject of marijuana legalization, 
the idea that users of cocaine, a potent stimulant, may be placed into the same study 
alongside users of marijuana, a hallucinogen and depressant, in order to determine whether 
the drugs cause violent behavior in individuals without controlling for such variables is 
laughable at best. WORLD HEALTH ORG., NEUROSCIENCE OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCE USE 
AND DEPENDENCE 84–86, 89 (Centre for Addiction and Mental Health et al. eds., 2004). 
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a one-off decision, as the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning used in United 
States v. Carter (Carter II) without question when ruling that the Gun Control 
Act applied equally to qualified patients as any other users of illegal drugs.275 
In order to enforce the federal ban on firearms possession by marijuana users 
in the age of increasing acceptance and use of medical marijuana, the ATF 
recently released its policy regarding firearms sales to qualified patients. 
ATF OPEN LETTER: Published on September 21, 2011, the Open 
Letter276 contained guidance handed down from the ATF to apprise federally-
licensed firearms sellers of the agency’s policy regarding sales to qualified 
patients and marijuana users. Specifically, the ATF Open Letter requires that 
licensees must refuse any firearms transaction to a person they have 
“reasonable cause to believe” is a user of marijuana.277 Reasonable cause may 
include, but is not limited to, “an inference of current use” drawn from 
“evidence of recent use or possession” or a “pattern of use or possession that 
reasonably covers the present time.”278 The ATF’s policy provides no 
exceptions, even where medical marijuana has been legalized and the 
individual is a qualified patient.279 By publishing the policy, the ATF 
knowingly drafted firearms licensees into its service to police marijuana 
users and qualified patients based on little more than bare suspicion or 
inference.280 The ATF Open Letter has been upheld as a valid policy measure 
by the Ninth Circuit,281 though it is still a controversial measure.282 
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION 
This Part seeks to unite parts I and II by showing that the state laws 
legalizing medical marijuana are constantly and consistently undermined by 
federal law on marijuana, because it forces qualified patients to choose 
between therapeutic medicine and the right to bear arms. Further, this Part 
will explain why qualified patients should not only be afforded their Second 
Amendment rights, but also offers guidance on future challenges to the Gun 
Control Act. Section A discusses the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in 
                                                 
 275. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1094. 
 276. Arthur Herbert, Open Letter to all Federal Firearms Licensees, BUREAU OF 
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES (Sept. 21, 2011), https://perma.cc/WJX6-
FN6X. 
 277. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3)). 
 278. Id. (quoting 27 C.F.R. § 478.11). 
 279. Id. 
 280. When purchasing a firearm from a federal licensee, an individual must complete 
ATF Form 4473 and is compelled by federal law to make a candid admission of use of 
illegal drugs, which asks if the individual is a user of illegal drugs and notes that medical 
marijuana legalization does not affect federal laws criminalizing marijuana use or possession 
at question 11.e. Id.; see also BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, 
FORM 4473, FIREARMS TRANSACTION RECORD (revised Oct. 2016). 
 281. Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 282. See generally Steve Byas, Use Pot – Even Medical Marijuana – and Lose your 
Second Amendment Rights, NEW AM. (Jan. 16, 2018) https://perma.cc/D57K-XKAG. 
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Wilson v. Lynch, which made use of the post-Heller two-step test qualify the 
Second Amendment rights of a qualified patient. Section B describes the 
shortcomings of Wilson’s use of that test, as well as its application to similar 
questions in the future. Finally, Section C will discuss why the DOJ, DEA, 
and ATF’s enforcement of the CSA or Gun Control Act is currently illegal 
under application of the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment. 
A. Modest Collateral Burdens: Wilson v. Lynch 
In 2000, Nevada enacted comprehensive medical marijuana 
legalization for which the plaintiff, S. Rowan Wilson, registered in 2011, 
becoming a qualified patient.283 In October of the same year, Wilson 
unsuccessfully attempted to purchase a firearm from a federally-licensed 
seller.284 Although Wilson claimed that her registration was intended to 
“convey a particularized message in support of medical use of marijuana” 
and that she never used marijuana,285 the firearms dealer had recently learned 
of the ATF Open Letter.286 After the sale was refused, Wilson sued the 
Attorney General and ATF, alleging numerous violations of her 
constitutional rights.287 
Based upon circuit precedent for challenges to the Gun Control Act 
set by United States v. Chovan, the Ninth Circuit applied its version of the 
post-Heller two-step test to Wilson’s claims.288 The court held that part one 
was satisfied because the legislation in question and the ATF Open Letter 
each “directly burden her core Second Amendment right to possess a 
firearm” by “preventing Wilson from purchasing a firearm.”289 Before 
proceeding to step two, the court determined that intermediate scrutiny 
analysis was appropriate, as the burden to Wilson was “not severe.”290 
Wilson conceded that the government has a substantial interest in 
preventing gun violence, but argued that application of the Gun Control Act 
was unconstitutional because her registration was merely an act of political 
                                                 
 283. See NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 38; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453A.200 (LexisNexis 
2017). 
 284. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1089. 
 285. Id. at 1095. 
 286. Wilson completed ATF Form 4473 but did not answer question 11.e, which led the 
firearms seller to refuse the transaction. Id. at 1089–90; see also supra note 280 and 
accompanying text. 
 287. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1090. Wilson asserted that section 922(d)(3), (g)(3) of the Gun 
Control Act, title 27 Code of Federal Regulations section 478.11, and the ATF Open Letter 
all violated her Second Amendment rights. Id. Additionally, Wilson alleged violations of her 
First and Fifth Amendment rights and that the ATF Open Letter violated the Administrative 
Procedure Act. Id. 
 288. Id. at 1092 (quoting United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 
2013)). 
 289. Id. at 1092. 
 290. Id. at 1093 (holding that Wilson could have obtained firearms before becoming a 
qualified patient or given up her status altogether). 
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speech but also because application wrongly deprives qualified patients of 
their constitutional rights by deeming them more violent simply by virtue of 
their status as qualified patients.291 The government, meanwhile, contended 
that empirical data from scientific studies supports a “strong link between 
drug use and violence” and that the Gun Control Act should be applied to 
qualified patients as any other illegal drug users.292 
This link, the court argued, is of particular importance because 
Congress’ purpose in creating the Gun Control Act was to keep firearms 
away from “presumptively risky people.”293 If illegal drugs users, including 
qualified patients, are more likely to act violently than the general public, the 
government may argue that the regulation is both important and a reasonable 
fit. Based upon the evidence presented in Carter II294 and reasoning that 
marijuana users are “more likely” to engage in illegal conduct to obtain 
marijuana, the Ninth Circuit agreed that a link exists between marijuana use 
and violence.295 The court did note that its concerns about violence 
perpetrated by qualified patients may be overstated because they “often 
suffer from debilitating illnesses, for which marijuana may be an effective 
palliative,” but did not alter its holding in any meaningful way.296 
Wilson contended that the government’s purported reasonable fit 
could not apply to her as she was a qualified patient for political purposes 
only, an assertion that resonated with the Ninth Circuit, though not 
sufficiently to rule in her favor.297 Further, she alleged that the ATF Open 
Letter effectively made any federally-licensed firearms dealer into a police 
officer so long as they have “reasonable cause to believe” an individual is a 
marijuana user while still allowing dealers to make a “blanket assertion” 
finding that any qualified patient is a marijuana user “without any 
investigation or due process.”298 The Ninth Circuit, however, disregarded 
these claims by favorably comparing these actions to Terry Stops made by 
police who reasonably believe an individual to be armed and dangerous.299 
The court further held that the ATF’s policy “simply clarifies that a firearms 
dealer has ‘reasonable cause to believe’ an individual is an unlawful user if 
                                                 
 291. Id. at 1093–95. 
 292. Id. at 1093 (citing United States v. Carter (Carter II), 750 F.3d 462, 466–69 (4th 
Cir. 2014)); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2010). Though neither 
party offered evidence to back their assertions, the Ninth Circuit accepted the government’s 
contentions based on evidence accepted in two prior holdings from the Fourth and Seventh 
circuits, both of which applied the Gun Control Act to marijuana users. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 
1093–95. 
 293. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1093 (citation omitted). 
 294. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 467–69. 
 295. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1094. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 1094–95. 
 298. Id. at 1099–1100. 
 299. Id. at 1095 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). The court’s reasoning 
here does nothing to rebut claims that the ATF Open Letter is a vast overreach of police 
power without concern for due process. 
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she holds a registry card” and therefore raises no due process concerns.300 A 
distinction without a difference if ever one could be said to exist. 
To the court and government, the resolution was imminently 
reasonable, if inconvenient to qualified patients: Congress passed the Gun 
Control Act in order to prevent gun violence and included a qualification 
against illegal drug users because it found such individuals to be more violent 
than the general public based on the psychopharmacological model of 
violence; qualified patients use marijuana, which is an illegal drug under 
federal law; therefore, qualified patients are illegal drug users and thus 
subject to the same qualifications as other illegal drug users, whether they 
share the same characteristics or obtained a registry card for other reasons.301 
Any, admittedly possible, constitutional violations visited upon qualified 
patients, the court stated, are simply “modest collateral burdens” that are to 
be tolerated.302 
B. Applying the Two-Step Test to Qualified Patients Appropriately 
Admittedly, the Wilson decision is not entirely analogous to the bulk 
of cases that courts are likely to adjudicate in the future involving qualified 
patients and challenges to the Gun Control Act. Wilson registered solely as 
an expression of her views on the subject of marijuana legalization and did 
not use the substance.303 If we accept this as true, as the Ninth Circuit did, 
then Wilson certainly posed no greater danger than any other member of the 
general public and the government offered no evidence to the contrary. Yet, 
the court still found the government’s argument persuasive and held that 
Wilson’s constitutional rights had not been violated. This, perhaps 
counterintuitively, is the precise reason a case like Wilson is so illustrative of 
the problem faced by qualified patients nationwide. 
Wilson presented the Ninth Circuit with a unique opportunity upon 
which the court failed to capitalize. The Ninth Circuit maintains federal 
appellate jurisdiction over nine states and two territories, of which all but two 
states have created comprehensive medical marijuana programs304 covering 
at least 2.1 million qualified patients.305 Rather than issue a narrow opinion 
                                                 
 300. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1099–1100. 
 301. Id. at 1094–95. 
 302. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1095. Wilson unsuccessfully appealed the ruling to the 
Supreme Court. Wilson v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1396 (2017) cert. denied. 
 303. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1095. 
 304. Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and 
Washington all maintain programs while Idaho and the Northern Mariana Islands do not. See 
infra Appendix, Table 1. 
With the addition of Florida in the Eleventh Circuit and Louisiana in the Fifth Circuit, all 
federal circuits now maintain appellate jurisdiction over at least one state with a 
comprehensive medical marijuana regime. See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 305. The Ninth Circuit is home to at least 88% of all qualified patients in the United 
States. See ProCon.org, Number of Legal Medical Marijuana Patients (May 17, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/E7SG-C8KK. This estimate notes the difficulty in accurately calculating 
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on a complex and novel area of law, the court admittedly306 applied a 
constitutionally-burdensome standard to all qualified patients. The following 
analyzes the correct application of the post-Heller two-step test and explains 
how the standard should be used in future cases involving qualified patients. 
1. Does the Regulation Burden Conduct Protected by the Second 
Amendment? 
At a basic level, the answer to this question is likely an unequivocal 
“yes.” Clearly, the Gun Control Act infringes upon a qualified patient’s 
constitutional rights and the act of possession of a firearm is otherwise 
protected by the Second Amendment following Heller. More context and 
nuance will be required of future challenges, however, because some federal 
circuits have expanded the first step inquiry to include historical context and 
its bearing on narrow category prohibitions. Wilson did not face such 
inquiries as she maintained she was not an unlawful drug user and thus, any 
historical review at the first step was inapplicable to her case.307 
While this Article argues that scientific evidence proves that 
qualified patients are no more violent than the general public and that the 
federal government cannot meet its burden under the two-part test for 
individual category qualifications as-applied to qualified patients,308 
marijuana is still illegal at the federal level under the CSA and qualified 
patients who are admitted marijuana users must contend with that fact. This 
alone likely ensures that qualified patients suing for restoration of their 
Second Amendment rights will have to respond to questions that Wilson did 
not.309 
The first and most pressing of these questions concerns the historical 
precedent for qualification of firearm possession for users of illegal drugs, a 
                                                 
numbers in states such as California and Washington, where registration programs are either 
wholly elective or were not mandated until many years after creation, though the 
methodology used has been cited as an accurate representation. Id. at nn.2, 6 & 9. No 
estimate is available for Guam. Id. 
 306. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1096. 
 307. Although numerous federal courts have weighed in on the meaning and import of 
“longstanding” and “presumptively lawful” from Heller, illegal drug use was not mentioned 
in reference to those terms, so qualified patients will likely be spared having to argue that 
issue. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 627 n.26 (2008). 
 308. Under the two-step test, the qualified patient would necessarily assert an as-
applied challenge to section 922(g)(3). A facial challenge to the Gun Control Act would fail 
under this context because a “person to whom a statute properly applies can’t obtain relief 
based on argument that a differently situated person might present.” United States v. Skoien, 
614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010). As-applied challenges, which asks a court to rule a 
provision or section unconstitutional as-it-applies to the litigant, and / or similarly-situated 
individuals, conversely, are the more common and preferred method to use to challenge to a 
federal statute. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–51 
(2008); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). 
 309. See United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683–85 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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highly-contentious issue. In a somewhat related matter, the issue of historic 
precedent for felon-in-possession laws has been addressed numerous times 
by federal courts, with no firm answer. Taking Heller at face value, a reader 
would be inclined to believe that all felons had been barred from possessing 
firearms long before 1968 and that the issue was well-settled,310 but that is 
not the case. Not only are the federal circuit courts unsure on the matter, legal 
scholars have debated the issue for many years, with no consensus 
achieved.311 
The debate on historicity is no less fraught—nor inconclusive—
when discussing qualifications for users of illegal drugs. Though most 
federal circuit court cases involving section 922(g)(3) have avoided the 
question of history all together,312 the Seventh Circuit did attempt an analysis 
in Yancey.313 There, the court reviewed common law history and legal 
precedent to find that “unvirtuous citizens” could have their Second 
Amendment rights qualified.314 
First, the court referenced Congress’s objectives in creating the Gun 
Control Act before citing some 27 state and district laws that purportedly 
outlawed firearms possession by illegal drug users—including qualified 
patients—thus implying that Congress was not alone in viewing such 
individuals as “unfit to possess firearms.”315 However, the Seventh Circuit’s 
conclusion ignored the seven states that maintained comprehensive medical 
marijuana programs at the time of the decision, five of which contained 
language exempting qualified patients from abridgement of their rights and 
privileges based on their status as qualified patients.316 According to Yancey, 
                                                 
 310. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
 311. See United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171, 1174–75 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016); 
compare C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 695, 708–19 (2009) (stating that forfeiture of weapons upon conviction of a 
violent felony likely occurred during the common law era, but the felon was not barred from 
possession after serving her prison sentence and that felon-in-possession laws were largely 
nonexistent before World War I) with Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second 
Amendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1362–
64 (2009) (discussing differences in felonious activities). 
 312. See, e.g., United States v. Carter (Carter I), 669 F.3d 411, 415–16 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(stating that the court is not required to address the historical requirements behind step one 
unless it holds that the government has not met its burden at step two); United States v. 
Dugan, 657 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 313. Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683–85. 
 314. Id. at 685 (citations omitted). 
 315. Id. at 684. 
 316. Among the 27 states listed, California, Colorado, D.C., Hawaii, Nevada, New 
Jersey, and Rhode Island each had comprehensive medical marijuana regimes, with 
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Jersey, and Rhode Island each having laws exempting 
qualified patients from such regulations. Moreover, all other states that have adopted 
comprehensive programs and finalized their laws since Yancey was decided have created 
similar exceptions. See infra Appendix, Table 2. 
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this means that most states with comprehensive programs view qualified 
patients as fit to possess firearms along with the general public.317 
Second, the court tied qualifications for illegal drug users to felon-
in-possession laws, but noted the ongoing debate regarding the history of 
felon-in-possession laws, especially those that include non-violent felons.318 
That debate notwithstanding, the Seventh Circuit then opined that “most 
scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied 
to the concept of a virtuous citizenry.”319 As part of its basis for making this 
statement, the court referenced a 1938 federal law that, it says, codified rules 
against non-violent felons possessing firearms. Presumably, this is in 
reference to the Federal Firearms Act, a law that only qualified firearms 
possession for individuals who committed “crimes of violence” and made no 
mention of either non-violent felonies or drug offenses.320 
Regardless of the Seventh Circuit’s confusing statements, the 
qualified patient should move beyond the first step as the historical basis for 
qualification for illegal drug use is, at best, uncertain, and some federal 
circuits will defer to the second step regardless.321 Indeed, marijuana was not 
outlawed in most states until the 1930s322 and was not made a felony until 
1937.323 Further, it is a non-violent felony and was not made a qualifying 
offense until 1968.324 Prior to 1930s, however, we are left with the same 
academic debate from Phillips325 and Yancey,326 which produces no hard 
evidence to suggest that this qualification of illegal drug users has historical 
merit. Conversely, it appears that medical marijuana use, as a non-violent 
felony offense, would be categorized as an action that would not have 
resulted in qualification prior to World War I.327 Therefore, this Article will 
proceed to the second step. 
                                                 
 317. Yancey, 621 F.3d at 684. 
 318. Id. at 685. 
 319. Id. at 684–85. 
 320. Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 5-785, 52 Stat. 1250 §§ (6), (2)(e)-(f) (1938); 
see also Marshall, supra note 311, at 729–30. Non-violent felonies and illegal drug use were 
not added as qualifying offenses until the Gun Control Act 30 years later. See Pub. L. No. 
90-618, § 922(d)(3), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2017)). 
 321. See sources supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text. 
 322. See Mikos, supra note 36, at 1427 n.14. 
 323. A precursor to the CSA, Congress approved the Marihuana Tax Act in 1937 as the 
first federal ban on marijuana. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551. 
The predecessor to the Marihuana Tax Act, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, 
regulated only cocaine and opium, though it is widely viewed as a catalyst for later federal 
narcotics legislation. TODD GARVEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43435, MARIJUANA: 
MEDICAL AND RETAIL – SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2015); see also Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 
Stat. 785 (1914). 
 324. Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922(d)(3), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(3) (2017)). 
 325. United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 326. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 327. See Marshall, supra note 311, at 698, 708. 
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2. Does the Restriction or Regulation Pass Muster Under Any Appropriate 
Level of Scrutiny? 
Federal courts have unanimously agreed that individual category 
qualifications stemming from the Gun Control Act should be analyzed under 
an intermediate level of scrutiny.328 Though intermediate scrutiny has been 
described in numerous ways, the Ninth Circuit in Chovan gave a particularly 
efficient description of the government’s burden, requiring “(1) the 
government’s stated objective to be significant, substantial, or important; and 
(2) a reasonable fit between the challenged regulations and the asserted 
objective.”329 As a preliminary matter, qualified patients should concede the 
first part of the intermediate scrutiny analysis as the federal government’s 
stated objective in creating and defending the Gun Control Act of keeping 
“firearms out of the hands of presumptively risky people” appears 
ironclad.330 However, even conceding the first part, intermediate scrutiny still 
requires the government to enunciate not only an appropriate objective but 
also furnish proof that a reasonable fit exists between the regulation and the 
objective. 
The necessary amount of proof is determined by reference to the type 
of temporal limitation imposed by the individual category qualification in the 
Gun Control Act.331 Thus the question becomes whether the temporal 
limitation, as applied to qualified patients, is permanent, limited, or perhaps 
a third option? Federal circuit courts have routinely held that individuals 
barred from possessing firearms under section 922(g)(3) suffer only a 
temporary deprivation of their rights, reasoning that the qualification extends 
only for the duration of the illegal conduct and applies solely to “current drug 
users.”332 Wilson expanded that standard to qualified patients, stating that 
such individuals could regain their Second Amendment rights at any time 
“by surrendering [their] registry card[s].”333 
It is quite unlikely that federal courts will consider the qualification 
of qualified patients to be a permanent temporal limitation on par with 
individuals adjudicated as mentally-ill or felons due to unanimous agreement 
between the circuits in opposition to the idea. However, the status of qualified 
                                                 
 328. See generally cases cited supra notes 234–40 (comparing federal appellate court 
treatment of Second Amendment cases to First Amendment cases). 
 329. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States 
v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
 330. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n.6 (1983). 
 331. See generally cases cited supra notes 245–47 
 332. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United States 
v. Carter (Carter I), 669 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Patterson, 431 F.3d 
832, 839 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jackson, 280 F.3d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 333. Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2016). While Wilson did not make 
an argument based upon the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, it should be noted that the 
actions of the DOJ and ATF are almost certain violations of that rule and should cease while 
it is in effect. See infra note 363 and Part III.C. 
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patients should not be regarded with the flippancy typically shown by federal 
courts to illegal drug users or considered analogous with individuals under 
domestic violence protective orders.334 Qualified patients represent a 
different dynamic than the simple black-and-white formulation made by the 
Gun Control Act, Wilson, or other federal court decisions. Whereas, courts 
have instructed users of illegal drugs to abandon their use of narcotics to 
avoid qualification, giving the same instructions to qualifying patients is a 
far greater ask. In effect, giving such an ultimatum is akin to asking an 
individual to choose between one of the most cherished constitutional rights 
in all of American history and the use of medicine, as defined by a consensus 
of the scientific and medical communities and by more than 30 states.335 This 
is an unacceptable choice wrought by bad policy and a reliance on incorrect 
science as common sense. 
Though federal courts have heretofore recognized only two levels of 
temporal limitation, qualified patients may represent a third level between 
those that are truly limited and those that are permanent like in Tyler. An 
intermediate temporal limitation, as it were. This third level would place the 
amount of proof required somewhere between what was offered in Carter II 
and in Tyler, although by all practical definitions, the amount of scientific 
proof offered appears to have been roughly the same—at least in terms of the 
total number of studies referenced.336 However, even assuming federal courts 
decline to accept or even entertain a third type of temporal limitation, a 
careful review of available, scientifically-rigorous longitudinal evidence 
should conclude that the government’s purported fit is unreasonable, because 
it cannot show there is a continued risk of violence presented by qualified 
patients who have no history indicating other types of individual category 
qualification possessing firearms.337 Indeed, it may be that the type of 
temporal limitation is inconsequential, so long as the court is willing and able 
to properly review the scientific context. 
Put simply, the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion in Carter II, which was 
later adopted fully by the Ninth Circuit in Wilson, was incorrect from 
scientific, medical, and legal perspectives. There, the court made clear that it 
saw little reason to address marijuana users specifically, instead choosing to 
                                                 
 334. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) (2016); United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 125 (4th 
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two government surveys—to determine that there is a “strong link between drug use and 
violence.” United States v. Carter (Carter II), 750 F.3d 462, 467–69 (4th Cir. 2014). In 
Tyler, the Sixth Circuit consulted the same number but arrived at the opposite conclusion in 
regard to individuals adjudicated as mentally-ill under similar circumstances to the plaintiff. 
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sherriff’s Dep’t 837 F.3d 678, 694–97 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 337. See supra notes 267–70, 272, 329. 
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lump all drug users together, stating that the court was not required to make 
such a “particularized demonstration” on the matter.338 A close reading of the 
opinion appears to show that the court went to such lengths to avoid any 
particularized demonstration in order to avoid ruling in favor of the 
defendant.339 However, if the purpose of the ruling is to ascertain the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied to the individual and that person did 
not use illegal drugs outside marijuana—like Carter340—comparisons to 
studies purporting to show a link between drug use and violence that mix 
numerous other drugs in with marijuana are circumstantial and should not be 
applied to the individual in question.341 
In Carter II, the court reviewed four studies and two government 
surveys, five of which were offered by the government. Of those reviewed, 
none claim to be longitudinal in nature and to show a causal link between 
marijuana use and violence.342 Of the five pieces of evidence presented by 
the government, two were annual reports of government survey data showing 
statistics for crimes committed and drug use by those individuals amongst 
prisoners and arrestees.343 While such aggregations are useful in some 
respects, proving a causal link between marijuana use and violent behavior 
is not one of them.344 The government also introduced three studies, which 
                                                 
 338. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 467. 
 339. The court argued that the Wei study’s conclusion, which failed to “identify a 
statistically significant correlation” between marijuana use and violent behavior, was not 
“particularly relevant” after citing the same study to argue the opposite point of its 
conclusion in the same paragraph. In order to argue against the study, the court went so far 
as to impugn its methodology and valuations because it used “hard drug use” as a risk factor 
for violence and this “weakened the correlation,” all without noting that Carter was not a 
user of “hard drugs” so the diminished correlation would have applied specifically to him. 
Id. at 468 & n.15 (citing Evelyn H. Wei, Rolf Loeber, & Helene Raskin White, Teasing 
Apart the Developmental Associations Between Alcohol and Marijuana Use and Violence, 
20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 166, 179 (2004)). 
 340. Carter II, 750 F.3d 462. 
 341. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 694–98 (noting at least four separate instances where the court 
deemed the government’s empirical evidence to be insufficient as it did not apply 
specifically to the plaintiff or similarly-situated individuals). 
 342. The Oser study notes as much in its discussion where the authors state that the data 
examined was correlational, not causational in nature and that “longitudinal data are ideal” 
for such studies. Oser et al., supra note 271, at 1300. 
 343. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 467 n.3, 468 n.9. 
 344. Lana Harrison & Joseph Gfroerer, The Intersection of Drug Use and Criminal 
Behavior: Results from the Nat’l Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 38 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 422, 439–41 (1991). In fact, the Harrison and Gfroerer study has harsh 
criticism for the types of government surveys cited positively by the Carter II court. In their 
discussion, the authors chastise the method by which the National Household Survey on 
Drug Abuse (“NHSDA”) gathers and reports data, stating flatly that bias, underreporting, 
and under-coverage are all likely to be present in the numbers used by those studies due to 
insufficient data collection measures. Subsequent reviews confirm that government surveys, 
such as those by NHSDA, still contain numerous reporting and data collection issues more 
than 20 years later, such as processing errors in tabulating survey data, inferential errors due 
to “poor study design and execution,” and specification errors in what is being researched. 
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the court relied upon heavily,345 even though two of them reach conclusions 
that directly contradict the point for which they were offered and cited by the 
Fourth Circuit and a third is wholly inapplicable.346 The final study, which 
was offered by the defendant, was cited by the court in the same paragraph 
both as evidence that marijuana use and violence “coincide” and, oddly 
enough, as a cudgel against the study’s authors for failing to find any 
correlation between marijuana and violence when controlling for risk factors 
and not using relaxed standards of scientific rigor that Congress employs.347 
Instead of reading these studies for their conclusions and ruling based upon 
that information, it seems more likely that both the government and the court 
cherry-picked data from tables or sections that backed their preferred 
outcome and ignored the vast amounts of evidence contained in those same 
studies that did not. 
Contrary to the arguments of the courts in Carter II and Wilson, 
longitudinal studies performed over more than 30 years have shown that 
marijuana does not correspond to the psychopharmacological model of 
violence and its use does not make individuals more violent.348 One recent 
study, performed in 2016, found that marijuana causes decreased levels of 
                                                 
Timothy P. Johnson, Sources of Error in Substance Use Prevalence Surveys, INT’L 
SCHOLARLY RESEARCH NOTICES 12 (2014). 
 345. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 467 nn.2 & 5–6. 
 346. The Fourth Circuit cited the Harrison and Gfroerer study to show that individuals 
who have used marijuana in combination with alcohol and/or cocaine are more likely to be 
violent than those who only use alcohol. Id. at 467. The court’s primary hypothesis, taken 
from a table showing outcomes, is rebutted in the results and discussion of the study, 
however, where the authors state, “[t]here is no firm evidence of a causal relationship 
between drug use and crime,” be it violent or otherwise. Harrison & Gfroerer, supra note 
344, at 423. In citing to Oser, the Fourth Circuit appears to have taken a table from a study 
out of context, again, as the authors’ discussion makes clear. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 467. The 
Oser study, which the authors note was not longitudinal in nature, found that a link between 
drug use and violence exists, but only for male stimulant users in rural populations—not 
marijuana users—and still attributed much of the nexus between drug use and violence to 
violent victimization and economic compulsion brought on by a host of outside factors. Oser 
et al., supra note 271, at 1298–1301. 
 In citing the McCoy study, the Fourth Circuit states that it found cocaine and/or opiate 
users—categorized as “Chronic Drug Users” by the authors—are more likely to be violent, 
which is generally correct according to the findings of the study, but the court failed to note 
that the study also found that individuals who “may have used marijuana or other drugs” but 
were not Chronic Drug Users were not more likely to commit violent acts. Carter II, 750 
F.3d at 467; H. Virginia McCoy, Sarah E. Messiah, & Zhinuan Yu, Perpetrators, Victims, 
and Observers of Violence: Chronic and Non-Chronic Drug Users, 16 J. INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 890, 893–94, 903–907 (2001). 
 347. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 468 & nn.10, & 12–15. 
 348. See Wei, supra note 339, at 197; see also text accompanying supra note 338. See 
generally Sharon M. Boles & Karen Miotto, Substance Abuse and Violence: A Review of the 
Literature, 8 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 155 (2003); R. Myerscough & S. Taylor, The 
Effects of Marijuana on Human Physical Aggression, 49 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1541 
(1985); Helene Raskin White, Rolf Loeber, Magda Stouthamer-Loeber & David P. 
Farrington, Developmental Associations Between Substance Use and Violence, 11 DEV. & 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 785 (1999). 
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aggression—lower than individuals ingesting alcohol and those given a 
placebo who were sober—even when scientists attempted to agitate test 
subjects.349 This is directly in line with other studies showing that marijuana 
decreases aggressiveness levels, leading to decreased levels of violence.350 
Another study compared 20 substances—including marijuana, cocaine, 
alcohol, and tobacco—and rated them from most to least harmful with scores 
divided between harm to others and harm to self.351 Of the 20 cited, marijuana 
was eighth, below both alcohol and cigarettes, meaning that it was not among 
the most harmful either to self or others and no correlation with violence 
could be shown.352 This is not to argue that individuals cannot have 
psychological episodes while consuming marijuana,353 but is intended to 
show that the analysis used by federal circuits is woefully inadequate and 
must be revised. Simply put, there is scant evidence to show that marijuana 
use causes violent behavior in greater instances than the general public and 
without such evidence, the government cannot meet its burden under 
intermediate scrutiny or the post-Heller two-step test. 
Moving beyond Carter II and the Fourth Circuit’s review of 
scientific studies and government surveys, there is ample evidence available 
from other sources to support the contention that marijuana use does not 
cause increased levels of violence. For instance, in Tyler, the majority relied 
heavily on Congress’ decision to revise the relief-from-disabilities provision 
of the Gun Control Act solely as it applied to individuals adjudicated as 
mentally-ill, which the Sixth Circuit viewed as a legislative determination 
indicating that Congress no longer considered such individuals to be more 
violent.354 Utilizing this reasoning, most of the states that maintain 
comprehensive medical marijuana programs, and laws forbidding possession 
of firearms by users of illegal drugs, do not consider qualified patients to be 
more violent as those individuals are exempted from such restrictions.355 
Though not as persuasive as the congressional decision in Tyler, these states 
have made their own legislative determinations indicating that they do not 
consider qualified patients to be more violent than the general public. 
                                                 
 349. E.B. de Sousa Fernandes Perna et al., Subjective Aggression During Alcohol & 
Cannabis Intoxication Before & After Aggression Exposure, 233 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 
3331, 3338–39 (2016). 
 350. See Myerscough & Taylor, supra note 348. 
 351. David J. Nutt, Leslie A. King & Lawrence D. Phillips, Drug Harms in the UK: A 
Multicriteria Decision Analysis, 376 LANCET 1558 (2010). 
 352. Id. at 1558, 1561 & fig.2, 1563 & fig.4. 
 353. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 45, at 296 & box 12-1, 326 
box 12-3. 
 354. See generally sources cited supra notes 248–51, 263. 
 355. Of the 27 states cited in Yancey, seventeen now have comprehensive medical 
marijuana programs, two have not finalized their laws yet, and thirteen exempt qualified 
patients from state firearms qualification laws. See supra text accompanying note 316; see 
infra Appendix, Table 2; see generally United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
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Further, the common sense conclusions arrived at by the Ninth 
Circuit in Wilson—arguing that qualified patients are even less prone to 
violence than typical marijuana users because the means and avenues through 
which marijuana has traditionally been purchased do not apply to them—are 
useful to show that marijuana users and qualified patients are not more prone 
to violence.356 The court stated that increased “negative interactions” with 
police and frequent use of “black market sources who themselves frequently 
resort to violence” were both factors indicating an increased penchant for 
violence in marijuana users.357 The holding goes on to state that it is arguable 
that “medical marijuana users are less likely to commit violent crimes, as 
they often suffer from debilitating illnesses” and they are not required to 
interact with police or the black market to obtain marijuana.358 At the time, 
the court ignored this hypothesis because it could not overcome concerns 
over “irrational or unpredictable behavior” from ingesting marijuana.359 
However, such concerns have been invalidated by the longitudinal, scientific 
evidence presented earlier in this Part, which shows that marijuana users are 
not prone to such risky behavior, and may in fact be less likely to become 
aggressive while using marijuana.360 Therefore, federal courts are free to 
accept the Ninth Circuit’s common sense hypothesis as an indicator that 
qualified patients are less likely to be prone to violence, a conclusion that 
some studies have also reached.361 Finally, it must be noted that the DOJ and 
ATF should be barred from undertaking this type of enforcement in states 
with medical marijuana regimes due to the restrictions of the Rohrabacher-
Farr Act.362 
Without a link between marijuana and violence, the government 
should not be able to meet the standards for either intermediate scrutiny or 
                                                 
 356. Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. See De Sousa Fernandes Perna et al., supra note 349. Common sense would also 
dictate that marijuana users are less prone to violence than the general public because 
alcohol use is far more common than marijuana use and “alcohol is the drug with the 
strongest association to violence.” See Oser et al., supra note 271, at 1287 (citations 
omitted). 
 361. One study, which analyzed the effects that medical marijuana legalization had on 
state crime by measuring the seven Part I Uniform Crime Reporting offenses from 1990-
2006, found that legalization led to reductions in homicide and assault rates, while robbery 
and burglary rates remained steady. Overall, the authors concluded that their “findings run 
counter to arguments suggesting the legalization of marijuana for medical purpose poses a 
danger to public health in terms of exposure to violent crime and property crimes.” Robert 
G. Morris et al., The Effect of Medical Marijuana Laws on Crime: Evidence from State 
Panel Data, 1990-2006, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 6–7 (2014). This reinforces other, more limited 
studies that have shown that marijuana legalization does not increase crime in states or cities 
where marijuana has been legalized recreationally. Angela Dills, Sietse Goffard, & Jeffrey 
Miron, Dose of Reality: The Effect of State Marijuana Legalization, CATO INST., 799 POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 1, 14–16 (Sept. 16, 2016). 
 362. See infra Part III, Section C. 
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the post-Heller two-step test. Overwhelmingly, longitudinal, scientific 
evidence shows that marijuana does not make its users more violent, and may 
even lessen an individual’s aggressive tendencies below the threshold of 
sober individuals. Further, legislative determinations by numerous states that 
have legalized medical marijuana show that they do now view qualified 
patients as more dangerous or prone to violence. Even common sense—
reinforced by studies of criminal activity rates—leads to the conclusion that 
marijuana does not make individuals more violent.363 Although the 
government can answer the first part of intermediate scrutiny analysis 
successfully, it cannot show that an objective fit exists between qualification 
of Second Amendment rights if it cannot prove that qualified patients are 
more violent. For the government, failing intermediate scrutiny analysis also 
means failing the second step of the post-Heller test, meaning that the 
qualification is unconstitutional, at least as applied to qualified patients. 
C. Preliminary Injunction: The Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment Blocks 
Gun Control Act and CSA Enforcement Against Qualified Patients 
While Part II.B argues that federal law and precedent require that 
federal courts revise their analysis of section 922(g)(3) for future cases 
involving qualified patients, the federal government currently faces a much 
direr threat to its marijuana enforcement strategies. Indeed, the Rohrabacher-
Farr Amendment, so long as it remains in force, presents a foundational 
impediment to any enforcement action undertaken using DOJ funds that 
would prevent states from implementing or furthering their medical 
marijuana laws or would seek to punish individuals or businesses that 
attempted to take advantage of those laws. Such restrictions extend to all of 
the DOJ’s subsidiary agencies,364 including the FBI, DEA, and the ATF and 
                                                 
 363. Though a small number of marijuana users do experience contraindications from 
ingestion, causing them symptoms outside those regularly expected, this is not uncommon of 
medicine and studies have shown that individuals who have mental disorders or who are 
predisposed to them may exhibit violence uncommon to typical marijuana ingestion. 
However, such outliers do not invalidate longitudinal data showing that marijuana either has 
no effect or lessens aggression and violence in most users and that qualified patients who do 
not fall under any of the other individual category qualification requirements of the Gun 
Control Act cannot be shown to be more violent than the general public. See Christopher 
Ingraham, Researchers got people drunk or high, then made a fascinating discovery about 
how we respond, WASH. POST (July 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/FZA3-LZ2J; see also supra 
text accompanying note 44; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED, supra note 45, at 289-
312. But see Sarah Young, Smoking Cannabis Increases Violent Behavior in Young People 
with Mental Health Disorders, Study Finds, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 9, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/XF45-BNUX. 
 364. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, (2018) https://perma.cc/7KN7-
9JML; see also United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(applying the holding to both the DOJ and the DEA); Brief of Members of Congress 
Rohrabacher (R-CA) and Farr (D-CA) as Amici in Support of Charles C. Lynch’s Motion for 
Rehearing En Banc, at 15–16, United States v. Lynch (9th Cir. May 5, 2015) (Nos. 10-
166 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:1: 115 
include any enforcement actions used by those agencies such as the DEA’s 
administration of the CSA or the ATF’s application of the Gun Control Act. 
Briefly, this subpart will address the problems inherent with the McIntosh 
strict compliance requirement as well as the tangible ramifications of the 
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment on DOJ enforcement policy. 
Although the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment is still a valid defense 
to many DOJ actions for many qualified patients, the strict compliance 
standard leaves obvious avenues for the DOJ to operate that should have been 
forbidden. Instead, the Ninth Circuit’s standard allows the DOJ and the 
federal government to continually maintain the threat that Rohrabacher-Farr 
was intended to quash, and one that the court has previously recognized as 
an unconstitutional threat and overreach in Conant. By allowing a federal 
agency to maintain the threat of arrest, prison time, and the forfeiture of rights 
that accompanies federal marijuana charges, the strict compliance standard 
fundamentally undermines the stated purpose and plain language of 
Rohrabacher-Farr by exerting undue influence and attempting to again 
criminalize conduct that a state has previously held to be legal.365 The 
following illustrates the shortcomings with the strict compliance standard. 
First, while the idea that qualified patients cannot strictly comply 
with state or municipal medical marijuana laws may seem laughable, it is a 
real and pressing concern in many states. Whereas medical marijuana laws 
are seemingly commonplace and have been in place for years, many 
outstanding legal questions have yet to be resolved, and many others are the 
subject of inconclusive court rulings and state circuit splits. For example, one 
outstanding legal question that has never been fully resolved in California 
involves quantity possession limits.366 While the amount is codified in most 
states, California law allows for “qualified patients, valid identification 
cardholders, and their primary caregivers to pool their efforts and resources 
to cultivate marijuana . . . in amounts necessary to meet the reasonable 
medical needs of qualified patients and cardholders.”367 However, no test 
exists to determine what constitutes a reasonable amount.368 In fact, due in 
part to allowing municipalities to adopt and modify parts of the state law, 
California’s laws are so scattered and contradictory at the municipal level 
that a set of guidelines issued by the State’s Attorney General in 2008 was 
                                                 
50219, 10-50264 ) (quoting members of the House of Representatives who opposed the 
amendment stating that subordinate agencies to the DOJ would also be affected). 
 365. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring). 
 366. See ProCon.org, 30 Legal Medical Marijuana States & DC: Laws, Fees, and 
Possession Limits (June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/4ABY-5C3T (noting that while some 
states have defined ounce or plant limitations, other states have vague “30-day supply” 
limits). 
 367. People v. London, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 392, 402 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 368. People v. Wright, 146 P.3d 531, 541–42 (Cal. 2006); see also People v. Kelly, 222 
P.3d 186, 196–97, 213–14 (Cal. 2010) (finding that attempts to establish possession limits 
via a new state law unconstitutionally abridged the state’s original medical marijuana law). 
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later deemed to be merely “persuasive” and therefore non-binding upon both 
citizens and state courts.369 Another example comes in the form of restrictions 
on dispensaries. Due to an oversight in drafting its legislation, the Michigan 
Supreme Court held that the state’s medical marijuana law did not allow for 
dispensaries to be licensed by the state.370 Conversely, the state law allowed 
but did not require municipalities to issue operating licenses until late 2017, 
when new state licenses were approved legislatively.371 Under either 
example, any Michigan or California qualified patient exercising their rights 
under state law in good faith could still be charged in federal court by the 
DOJ and this enforcement action would be well-within the McIntosh strict 
compliance standard, yet violating Rohrabacher-Farr. 
Second, the strict compliance requirement further allows the DOJ to 
commandeer state police functions and substitute its own decision-making 
authority where state law enforcement has previously determined that an 
individual was not breaking any state law. A brazen affront to the principals 
of federalism, usually championed by conservatives, the DOJ has utilized this 
tactic for many years, with Charles Lynch being the most notable example. 
Lynch was deemed by state law enforcement to have been acting in 
compliance with the law but was arrested by federal officers and later 
prosecuted by the DOJ anyway.372 In such instances, the purpose of 
Rohrabacher-Farr is directly frustrated, state efforts to enforce their own laws 
are undermined by a meddling federal agency, and individuals who should 
not be in court are subjected to expensive, pointless, and illegal hearings in 
federal court.373 Further, the strict compliance standard largely violates 
precedent in the Ninth Circuit, which has long required that state courts hear 
                                                 
 369. People v. Hochandel, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 347, 358, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); see also 
CAL. ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDELINE FOR THE SECURITY AND NON-DIVERSION 
OF MARIJUANA GROWN FOR MEDICAL USE (2008). 
 370. See State v. McQueen, 828 N.W.2d 644, 650–57 (Mich. 2013) (holding that 
although Michigan’s medical marijuana statutory definition of “medical use” of marijuana 
does include its sale, the law does not provide for the establishment of dispensaries or 
cultivation centers, or for transfers which would trigger immunity or affirmative defense 
provisions). 
 371. Kathleen Gray, Michigan: Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Can Stay Open – For 
Now, DETROIT FREE PRESS, (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://perma.cc/HNR4-9XGN. See 
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.27101-27801 (2016) (amending Michigan’s medical marijuana 
law to allow for dispensaries and other commercial facilities and transactions); Dep’t of 
Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Medical Marijuana Facility Licensing (2018) 
https://perma.cc/VL46-HXW6 (requiring implementation of new facilities licensing laws by 
December 15, 2017). 
 372. Brief of Sen. Mark Leno (SD-11) et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Charles C. 
Lynch’s Motion for Rehearing En Banc, at 13–15, United States v. Lynch, (9th Cir. May 7, 
2015) (Nos. 10-50219 and 10-50264). 
 373. Prior to the creation of Rohrabacher-Farr, defenses predicated upon legal medical 
marijuana use under state law were not accepted by federal courts. See, e.g. United States v. 
Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1083 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that the defendant was 
precluded from asserting a medical marijuana defense). 
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and determine the appropriateness of affirmative defenses predicated upon 
state law and introduced by a defendant.374 
Third, the McIntosh standard seemingly requires the DOJ to break 
multiple federal laws in order to bring enforcement actions before federal 
courts. Rohrabacher-Farr is unequivocal in its requirement that the DOJ not 
use any federal funding to prevent state medical marijuana laws from being 
implemented, yet the Ninth Circuit appears to have presented the DOJ with 
an out. However, the Amendment contains no such exception, thus placing 
the agency at odds with the law. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit failed to 
address the Anti-Deficiency Act,375 which states that an employee of the 
United States may not “make or authorize an expenditure or obligation 
exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the 
expenditure or obligation.”376 Though the Anti-Deficiency Act is typically 
used in contract disputes, the language is quite clear and is not delimited to 
those actions solely.377 Thus, by bringing an action that would chill medical 
marijuana implementation in federal court using funds appropriated by 
Congress, the DOJ is readily violating two federal laws: The Rohrabacher-
Farr Amendment and the Anti-Deficiency Act. 
In order to find that strict compliance is appropriate, the Ninth 
Circuit first argued that it was required to read the word “laws” literally, 
allowing it to find the narrowest interpretation and stating that it could not 
take legislative intent into account due to Supreme Court precedent.378 In its 
ruling, the court implied that the Supreme Court has long-forbidden federal 
courts from using legislative intent when interpreting an imprecise 
appropriations rider, but this conclusion appears to be a misreading of the 
cited cases. In Cherokee Nation, the Supreme Court utilized the Committee 
Reports and legislative statements to elucidate the meaning and requirements 
of a dense appropriation’s act on tribal funding.379 The language cited by the 
Ninth Circuit, when read in the context of the opinion, holds that legislative 
history is only forbidden if it is used to change the wording of an 
appropriations rider authorized by Congress.380 In Lincoln, the Supreme 
Court did not forbid the use of intent to glean the correct inference, but 
                                                 
 374. Strauss v. United States, 376 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Perez v. 
United States, 297 F.2d 12, 13–14 (5th Cir. 1961)). 
 375. Anti-Deficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 1341, 96 Stat. 923 (1982) (codified at 
31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2017)). 
 376. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2011). 
 377. For examples of how the Anti-Deficiency Act is traditionally applied, see 
generally Davis & Assocs., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 501 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2007); 
Union Pac. R.R. Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 730 (2002). 
 378. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 
Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 646 (2005)); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 
182, 192 (1993) (citations omitted). 
 379. 543 U.S. at 639–41. 
 380. Id. at 644–46 (finding against the federal government, which argued that specific 
provisions were invalid due to conflicting legislative history, though the final wording was 
clear in the enacted language). 
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instead forbid federal courts from taking legislative intent into account when 
determining how funds should be spent.381 In fact, Lincoln makes a 
distinction between “lump-sum appropriation[s],” like those described in the 
case, and those like Rohrabacher-Farr that contain specific language 
“statutorily restricting what can be done with those funds,” forbidding 
legislative intent in interpreting the former while making no such restrictions 
on the latter.382 
Thus, if federal courts look to legislative intent to interpret 
Rohrabacher-Farr, as the Supreme Court explicitly allowed and performed in 
Cherokee Nation, it is quite clear that it was written to eliminate federal 
“medical marijuana prosecutions and forfeiture actions immediately in states 
that permit the use of medical marijuana.”383 Six of the amendment’s 
sponsors argued during its debate that the rider was intended to halt all 
federal prosecutions of individuals taking advantage of medical marijuana 
laws.384 Indeed, the intent to stop the DOJ and its subsidiary agencies from 
prosecuting medical marijuana offenses, regardless of compliance with state 
law, was so well understood that opponents of the Amendment openly 
campaigned against it on these terms. One Representative stated that it would 
“make it difficult, if not impossible, for the DEA and [DOJ] to enforce the 
law” while another complained that the DEA would be unable to enforce the 
CSA and would be “prohibited from going into that person’s house growing 
as many plants as they want.”385 In short, the members of Congress who 
passed Rohrabacher-Farr were well aware of its scope and the intent of its 
writers, even where individuals were outwardly and knowingly in violation 
of medical marijuana laws, as that issue was to be resolved by the states 
themselves, not the federal government.386 
Regardless of whether the McIntosh standard is adopted by other 
federal courts, disposed of altogether, or results in a circuit split, 
Rohrabacher-Farr still presents a fundamental impediment to all DOJ 
enforcement as described in this Article. Not only does it require the DOJ to 
cease prosecution of any individual who is strictly compliant—in the Ninth 
Circuit—or otherwise, it also requires all DEA agents attempting to enforce 
the CSA in the enumerated states to cease those actions as well. This means 
all actions described in Section I.B should have already ceased because all 
funding for the DEA and its enforcement of the CSA comes directly from the 
                                                 
 381. 508 U.S. at 192–93. 
 382. Id. at 192. 
 383. See Brief of Members of Congress Rohrabacher (R-CA) and Farr (D-CA) as Amici 
in Support of Charles C. Lynch’s Motion for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 363, at 11. 
 384. Id. at 11–15. 
 385. Id. at 15–16 (statements of Reps. Fleming and Harris, respectively, both of whom 
opposed the Amendment); see supra note 364. 
 386. See generally Kris Hermes, Feds Back off Medical Marijuana Enforcement in 32 
States and DC, AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS (Dec. 29, 2014) https://perma.cc/U3ED-
Q5KX; Allayne Sherer, First major victory in the fight to end federal interference, 
AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS (May 31, 2014) https://perma.cc/3Z52-EA8N. 
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DOJ. Likewise, all ATF action to administer section 922(g)(3) of the Gun 
Control Act in those enumerated states should have ceased, including all 
requirements listed in the ATF Open Letter due to the ATF being a 
subordinate agency to the DOJ and receiving all its funding from them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article seeks to be the first to describe the constitutional 
violations being visited upon and threatened against qualified patients acting 
legally under state law by the federal government. When federal courts apply 
the Gun Control Act to qualified patients and deprive them of their right to 
bear arms, they are utilizing bad or misunderstood data and further 
misapplying precedent to do so. By analyzing this issue through a generalized 
framework looking at medical marijuana law and policy at both the state and 
federal levels as well as Second Amendment jurisprudence and the 
application of the former to the latter, this Article intends to serve as both an 
introduction to the subject and a guide for future discourse. 
It should also be noted that this Article does not seek the proliferation 
of additional firearms into a country already rife with violence and mass 
casualty incidents caused by them. Instead, the Article seeks to shed light on 
the constitutional violations that are occurring and call for equal treatment 
under federal and state law. 
While it may seem a laughable excuse to some, medical marijuana 
helps many Americans cope with pain, anxiety, death and the many side 
effects attendant to debilitating illnesses. Stigmatizing and punishing 
qualified patients is an unnecessary and unconstitutional overreach based on 
illegitimate science and the federal government’s prohibitionist attitude 
toward marijuana, and seemingly, little more. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table I: List of Comprehensive Medical Marijuana 
Programs by State with Federal Circuit Court387 
State 
Year  
Program                     
Adopted* 
           Federal  
           Circuit 
California 1996 Ninth 
Washington 1998 Ninth 
Oregon 1998 Ninth 
Alaska 1998 Ninth 
Maine 1999 First 
Colorado 2000 Tenth 
Nevada 2000 Ninth 
Hawaii 2000 Ninth 
Vermont 2004 Second 
Montana 2004 Ninth 
Rhode Island 2006 First 
New Mexico 2007 Tenth 
Michigan 2008 Eighth 
New Jersey 2009 Third 
Arizona 2010 Ninth 
D.C. 388 2010 D.C. 
Delaware 2011 Third 
Connecticut 2012 Second 
Massachusetts 2012 First 
New Hampshire 2013 First 
Illinois 2013 Seventh 
                                                 
 387. Information in Table 1 was compiled from the following sources: State Medical 
Marijuana Laws, Table 1, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS. (June 27, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/T75F-KZYG; see also ProCon.org, 29 Legal Medical Marijuana States & 
DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits, June 26, 2017, https://perma.cc/Q9YF-FXRS; 
MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 33. 
 388. In 1998, Washington, D.C. voters passed Initiative 59 with 69% voting in favor, 
but it was blocked congressionally via a spending measure, which was subsequently lifted in 
December 2009, allowing the District’s city council to vote to allow medical marijuana. 
Ashley Southall, Washington, D.C. Approves Medical Use of Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (May 
4, 2010), https://perma.cc/QW3C-URB9. 
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New York 2014 Second 
Minnesota 2014 Eighth 
Guam 2014 Ninth 
Maryland 2014 Fourth 
Puerto Rico 2015 First 
Ohio389 2016 Sixth 
Pennsylvania 2016 Third 
North Dakota390 2016 Eighth 
Arkansas 2016 Eighth 
Florida 2016 Eleventh 
Louisiana391 2016 Fifth 
West Virginia392 2017 Fourth 
* Year program was fully adopted by state either via popular vote 
or legislative act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 389. Ohio’s medical marijuana program is currently being implemented and is 
scheduled to become operational in September 2018. Timeline & Rules, OHIO MED. 
MARIJUANA CONTROL PROGRAM, https://perma.cc/45FE-QC7K. 
 390. North Dakota’s medical marijuana program is currently being implemented and is 
scheduled to open to the public sometime in 2018. John Hageman, North Dakota Health 
Dep’t Begins Implementing New Medical Marijuana Law, BISMARCK TIMES (May 2, 2017) 
https://perma.cc/5ZLQ-636N. 
 391. Prior to 1996, Louisiana was the only state with a medical marijuana law, 
however, it was symbolic and ineffective. Passed in 1978, the law allowed physicians to 
prescribe marijuana for medicinal purposes. James McClure, The First State to Legalize 
Medical Marijuana Is Finally About to Get it Right, CIVILIZED (May 17, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/Y699-JZ39. Recently however, state officials worked to amend the statute, 
resulting in Louisiana’s adoption of comprehensive medical marijuana program, available in 
2018. Melinda Deslatte, Louisiana Medical Marijuana Bill Signed, CANNABIST (May 20, 
2016) https://perma.cc/87V3-E8EC. 
 392. West Virginia’s implementation period is the longest of all recent adoptees with 
registration not expected to begin until July 1, 2019. Bureau for Pub. Health, West Virginia 
Medical Cannabis Program, W. VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES., (Apr. 20, 2017). 
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Table II: List of States with Laws Qualifying Gun Possession by Illegal Drug Users and Comprehensive 
Medical Marijuana Programs and Application to Qualified Patients 
 
State 
Statute Qualifying Gun 
Possession by Drug 
User 
Language Exempting 
Qualified Patients 
Language Enforcing 
Qualification 
California 
CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 12021(a)(1) (2011) 
(repealed 2012) 
People v. Leal, 210 Cal. 
App. 4th 829, 842 (1st Dist. 
App. 2012)393  
  
Colorado 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
12-203(1)(f) 
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII 
§ 14(2)(a)394 
  
Nevada 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 202.360(1)(d) 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 202.257(1)(b); 
453A.300395 
  
Hawaii 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-
7(c)(1) 
  
Paul Perrone, Firearm 
Registrations in Hawaii, 
2016, Department of the 
Attorney General, at 7-8 
& tbl.3396 
Rhode Island 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 47-6 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28.6-4   
New Jersey 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-
3(c)(2) 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-
6(b) 
  
D.C. 
D.C. CODE § 22-
4503(a)(4) 
  
D.C. CODE § 7-
1671.03(e)397 
Delaware 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 1448(a)(3) (2017) 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, 
§ 4903A(a) 
  
Massachusetts 
MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 
140 § 129B(1)(iii) 
MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 94C 
§§ 4; 6(A) 
  
New Hampshire 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 159:3(I)(b)(3) 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 126-X:2(i) 
  
Illinois 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/24-3.1(a)(3) 
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
130/25(a) 
  
                                                 
 393. See generally 210 Cal. App. 4th 829, 842 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 394. See Hutchins, supra note 87. 
 395. When read together, Nevada law states that firearm possession is illegal for a 
qualified patient only when the individual is both under the influence of marijuana and 
maintains actual physical possession of the firearm simultaneously, not solely for ownership. 
 396. According to Hawaii’s Attorney General, current qualified patients will be denied 
firearms permits by the State but may successfully obtain a permit “one year after the 
expiration” of registration card. 
 397. See Klieger et al., supra note 32; see generally D.C. CODE § 7-1671.08(c), (d) 
(2017). 
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Minnesota 
MINN. STAT. 
§ 624.713(1)(10)(iii) 
MINN. STAT. §§ 152.32(1), 
(2)(a) 
  
Maryland 
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. 
SAFE. § 5-133(b)(4), (5) 
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-
GEN. § 13-3313(a) 
  
Ohio 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2923.13(A)(4) 
Official rules not yet finalized 
Arkansas 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-
309(7) 
ARK CONST. amend. 98 
§ 3(a), (c), (i) 
  
Florida 
FLA. STAT. 
§ 790.25(2)(b)(1) 
FLA. STAT. 
§ 381.986(14)(a), (b) 
  
West Virginia 
W. VA. CODE § 61-7-
7(a)(2), (3) 
Official rules not yet finalized 
 
